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Summary	  
	  
In	  recent	  years,	  a	  burgeoning	  body	  of	  research	  in	  Asia	  and	  Africa	  has	  documented	  how	  policies	  to	  
formalise	  rural	  economies	  have	  often	  failed	  to	  empower	  poorer	  small-­‐scale	  producers	  due	  to	  socio-­‐
economic,	  institutional	  and	  political	  factors.	  Research	  on	  the	  link	  between	  formalisation	  frameworks	  
and	  livelihood	  insecurity	  is	  increasingly	  recognised	  as	  a	  priority.	  This	  study	  examines	  how	  national	  
formalisation	  policies	  can	  contribute	  to	  livelihood	  insecurity,	  focusing	  on	  the	  implications	  of	  
centralising,	  decentralising	  and	  recentralising	  power	  in	  regulatory	  processes.	  Developing	  an	  
approach	  for	  examining	  ‘scalar’	  features	  of	  formalisation	  debates	  that	  cut	  across	  a	  variety	  of	  rural	  
sectors,	  from	  land	  regulation	  to	  forestry	  regulation,	  the	  analysis	  draws	  upon	  a	  critical	  review	  of	  
policy	  documents	  as	  well	  as	  field	  observations	  and	  interviews	  and	  gives	  particular	  attention	  to	  cases	  
in	  Zimbabwe	  and	  Indonesia	  in	  small-­‐scale	  mining	  sectors.	  In	  these	  cases,	  efforts	  to	  decentralise	  
decision-­‐making	  power	  were	  short	  lived,	  ultimately	  replaced	  by	  national	  efforts	  to	  recentralise	  
power	  between	  2005	  and	  2012.	  
	  
The	  analysis	  illustrates	  how	  the	  supposed	  ‘benefits’	  of	  formalisation	  policies	  have	  been	  highly	  elusive	  
in	  low-­‐income	  rural	  communities,	  partly	  because	  small-­‐scale	  producers	  have	  been	  ostracised	  during	  
regulatory	  reform	  processes	  and	  implementation	  decision-­‐making.	  The	  analysis	  considers	  how	  
formalisation	  policies	  have	  been	  used	  to	  justify	  heavy-­‐handed	  law	  enforcement	  campaigns,	  
contextualising	  how	  private	  property	  enforcement	  and	  national	  environmental	  law	  became	  
contentious	  rationales	  for	  police	  crackdowns	  in	  recent	  years,	  leading	  to	  intensified	  livelihood	  
insecurities	  and	  a	  host	  of	  negative	  social,	  environmental	  and	  economic	  outcomes.	  The	  conclusions	  
suggest	  the	  need	  to	  carefully	  consider:	  (1)	  How	  access	  to	  the	  benefits	  of	  formalisation	  policy	  may	  
become	  more	  unequal	  in	  rural	  contexts	  when	  global	  and	  national	  policy	  strategies	  have	  a	  narrow	  
focus	  on	  building	  up	  the	  power	  of	  central	  states	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  alternative	  (more	  ‘local’)	  
governance	  scales;	  (2)	  How	  frictions	  between	  large-­‐scale	  and	  small-­‐scale	  production	  models	  may	  be	  
addressed	  by	  revising	  formalisation	  policy	  priorities;	  and	  (3)	  How	  research	  on	  the	  heterogeneous	  
dynamics	  of	  marginalisation	  within	  and	  across	  sectors	  could	  help	  steer	  national	  policy	  narratives	  
away	  from	  top-­‐down	  policy	  perspectives	  and	  towards	  perspectives	  that	  take	  better	  account	  of	  







International	  development	  analysts	  have	  frequently	  argued	  that	  a	  lack	  of	  adequate	  regulation	  in	  
low-­‐income	  countries	  is	  enabling	  illegal	  economic	  activities	  to	  flourish	  and	  perpetuating	  inefficient	  
resource	  use,	  thereby	  stifling	  economic	  growth	  and	  development	  (De	  Soto,	  2000;	  Wenar,	  2008).	  
Attempts	  to	  promote	  law	  and	  order	  in	  Africa	  and	  Asia	  have	  figured	  prominently	  in	  the	  priorities	  of	  
researchers	  in	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  other	  global	  agencies,	  and	  policymakers	  have	  widely	  praised	  
academic	  work	  that	  advocates	  for	  the	  enforcement	  of	  property	  rights	  as	  a	  way	  of	  stimulating	  greater	  
economic	  opportunities	  and	  bringing	  ‘win–win’	  benefits	  to	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  This	  ‘win–win’	  vision	  
of	  development	  and	  this	  particular	  relation	  between	  academia	  and	  policymakers	  is	  illustrated,	  for	  
example,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  former	  British	  Prime	  Minister	  Margaret	  Thatcher,	  who,	  while	  praising	  
Hernando	  De	  Soto’s	  book	  Mystery	  of	  Capital,	  declared	  that	  ‘the	  single	  greatest	  source	  of	  failure	  in	  
the	  Third	  World	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  rule	  of	  law	  that	  upholds	  private	  property	  and	  provides	  a	  framework	  
for	  enterprise.’1	  De	  Soto’s	  book	  argued	  that	  ‘capitalism	  succeeds	  in	  the	  West’	  and	  that	  poorer	  
countries	  were	  failing	  to	  mirror	  the	  successes	  of	  industrialised	  countries	  because	  of	  the	  failure	  to	  
delineate,	  promote	  and	  enforce	  private	  property	  rights	  (De	  Soto,	  2000,	  p.	  1).	  
	  
Neither	  De	  Soto’s	  nor	  Thatcher’s	  advocacies	  were	  confined	  to	  one	  economic	  sector.	  Their	  arguments	  
were	  that	  the	  enforcement	  of	  private	  property	  rights	  is	  needed	  across	  sectors,	  maintaining	  that	  
central	  governments	  in	  poorer	  countries,	  by	  implementing	  market-­‐friendly	  rules,	  should	  use	  private	  
property	  as	  the	  mechanism	  for	  unlocking	  the	  power	  of	  modern	  development.	  These	  narratives	  
resonate	  with	  wider	  trends	  in	  ‘formalisation’	  scholarship	  in	  recent	  years,	  addressing	  the	  land,	  
forestry	  and	  mining	  sectors,	  which	  have	  suggested	  that	  informal	  economic	  sectors	  must	  be	  
‘formalised’	  through	  processes	  that	  differentiate	  between	  legitimate	  and	  illegitimate	  activity	  and	  
bring	  the	  former	  into	  the	  officially	  regulated	  sector.2	  In	  critical	  research	  circles,	  however,	  the	  
dominant	  narrative	  of	  formalisation	  as	  a	  development	  solution	  has	  met	  with	  criticism	  for	  multiple	  
reasons.	  Musembi	  (2007)	  critiques	  De	  Soto’s	  depoliticised	  formalisation	  discourse	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
land	  management	  and	  contends	  that	  poorer	  populations	  can	  be	  marginalised	  by	  the	  various	  
institutional	  processes	  through	  which	  formal	  rights	  claims	  are	  negotiated.	  Her	  analysis	  in	  Kenya	  
stresses	  that	  there	  is	  an	  ‘unproven	  link’	  between	  formalisation’s	  theorised	  benefits	  and	  reality,	  
warning	  that	  mainstream	  narratives	  succumb	  to	  an	  ‘underlying	  social	  evolutionist	  bias	  which	  
presumes	  that	  individual	  ownership	  is	  ultimately	  inevitable	  for	  all	  social	  contexts’	  (p.	  1457).	  Various	  
studies	  suggest	  that	  formalisation	  policy	  prescriptions	  can	  be	  misguided	  because	  national	  
formalisation	  policies	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  diverse	  mix	  of	  negative	  and	  positive	  outcomes	  for	  different	  
groups	  (Cousins,	  2009;	  Kaarhus	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Sjaastad	  and	  Cousins,	  2008).	  Benjaminsen	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  
suggest	  that	  much	  of	  the	  scholarship	  on	  formalisation	  overlooks	  ‘risks	  inherent	  in	  the	  formalization	  
process	  itself’	  and	  the	  ‘problem	  of	  formalizing	  existing	  inequalities’	  (p.	  4).	  A	  growing	  body	  of	  sector-­‐
specific	  research	  documents	  how	  poorer	  populations	  of	  small-­‐scale	  producers	  have	  been	  
marginalised	  by	  the	  complex	  regional	  and	  global	  institutional	  processes	  through	  which	  formal	  rights	  
claims	  are	  contested,	  highlighting	  how	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  benefits	  of	  formalisation	  are	  unevenly	  
distributed	  in	  society	  (Cousins,	  2008;	  Maconachie	  and	  Hilson,	  2011;	  Parsa	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Siegel	  and	  
Veiga,	  2009;	  Sjaastad	  and	  Cousins,	  2008;	  Toulmin,	  2008).	   	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   Quoting	  Thatcher	  in	  Dyal-­‐Chand	  (2007,	  p.	  60).	  	  
2	   Benjaminsen	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  provide	  a	  wider	  critical	  review	  of	  various	  prominent	  formalisation	  discourses.	  
2	  
	  
This	  study	  contributes	  to	  the	  debate	  on	  why	  national	  governments	  pursue	  formalisation	  policies	  and	  
explores	  the	  consequences	  of	  formalisation	  policies	  for	  rural	  livelihoods,	  focusing	  on	  how	  livelihood	  
insecurities	  in	  contested	  land	  areas	  can	  vary	  and	  change	  when	  governments	  undertake	  reforms	  to	  
decentralise	  and	  recentralise	  power.	  Although	  it	  is	  common	  in	  global	  development	  discourse	  to	  
blame	  rural	  stakeholders	  for	  ‘local’	  development	  failures,	  a	  trend	  that	  Mohan	  and	  Stokke	  (2000)	  
critically	  examine	  in	  depth,3	  this	  study	  sets	  out	  to	  move	  beyond	  structural	  notions	  of	  local	  
development	  failure	  and	  instead	  focus	  on	  how	  ‘decentralisation’	  and	  ‘recentralisation’	  processes	  in	  
governance	  dynamics	  affect	  formalisation	  agendas	  in	  low-­‐income	  contexts.	  Ribot	  (2003)	  cautions	  
that	  ‘decentralisation’	  reforms	  often	  involve	  a	  ‘failure	  to	  transfer	  discretionary	  powers’	  (p.	  62)	  and	  
suggest	  that	  efforts	  at	  ‘decentralising’	  resource	  governance	  have	  not	  effectively	  supported	  
democratic	  governance	  and	  sustainable	  livelihood	  trajectories.	  Building	  on	  this	  concern,	  the	  analysis	  
developed	  below	  examines	  the	  impacts	  on	  formalisation	  agendas	  when	  national	  schematic	  visions	  of	  
law	  and	  order	  supplant	  local	  context-­‐guided	  decision-­‐making,	  considering	  the	  proposition	  that	  
exclusion	  of	  small-­‐scale	  producers	  from	  policy	  processes	  becomes	  especially	  significant	  when	  
national	  states	  take	  steps	  to	  recentralise	  power	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  decentralisation	  efforts.	  While	  cases	  
from	  across	  sectors	  are	  reviewed,	  particular	  attention	  is	  given	  to	  case	  studies	  in	  Zimbabwe	  and	  
Indonesia	  where	  the	  impacts	  of	  formalisation	  agendas	  were	  politically	  contentious	  during	  the	  course	  
of	  governance	  efforts	  to	  recentralise	  power	  between	  2005	  and	  2012.	  
	  
The	  analysis	  is	  divided	  into	  five	  sections.	  Section	  2	  reviews	  the	  conceptual	  literature	  on	  formalisation	  
frameworks,	  exploring	  how	  notions	  of	  livelihood	  insecurity	  feature	  in	  emerging	  critiques	  of	  
formalisation	  paradigms.	  Section	  3	  then	  focuses	  on	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  centralised	  formalisation	  
paradigms	  in	  relation	  to	  logging,	  land	  use	  and	  mining,	  exploring	  the	  proposition	  that	  formalising	  
livelihoods	  becomes	  more	  difficult	  when	  governance	  processes	  produce	  and	  enforce	  schematic	  
distinctions	  between	  legitimate	  and	  illegitimate	  livelihoods	  through	  highly	  centralised	  planning	  
processes.	  Section	  4	  examines	  a	  case	  study	  in	  Zimbabwe’s	  gold-­‐mining	  sector	  and	  Section	  5	  
examines	  a	  case	  study	  in	  Indonesia’s	  gold-­‐mining	  sector.	  In	  each	  case	  study,	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  
political	  factors	  influencing	  a	  particular	  resource	  regulation	  policy	  regime	  are	  briefly	  discussed,	  
followed	  by	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  factors	  leading	  to	  law	  enforcement	  and	  the	  impacts	  on	  livelihoods	  
during	  what	  I	  propose	  to	  term	  a	  ‘post-­‐decentralisation’	  era.	  In	  Section	  6,	  a	  comparative	  analysis	  
synthesises	  the	  main	  conclusions,	  highlighting	  converging	  socio-­‐political	  explanations	  of	  livelihood	  
insecurities	  in	  contested	  rural	  regions.	  Overall,	  while	  formalisation	  paradigms	  can	  impact	  livelihoods	  
in	  uneven	  ways,	  the	  conclusions	  also	  stress	  the	  need	  to	  critically	  conceptualise	  formalisation	  as	  a	  
cross-­‐sector	  challenge	  that	  calls	  into	  question	  the	  multi-­‐scalar	  politics	  of	  global	  and	  national	  efforts	  
to	  centralise	  formalisation	  regimes.	  Among	  other	  implications,	  in	  an	  era	  in	  which	  responsible	  
national	  governance	  is	  increasingly	  being	  touted	  as	  a	  development	  solution	  at	  United	  Nations	  (UN)	  
conferences,	  this	  study	  suggests	  that	  more	  careful	  attention	  should	  be	  given	  to	  possibilities	  for	  
decentralising	  rural	  resource	  governance	  powers.	  The	  study	  draws	  upon	  on	  an	  analysis	  of	  policy	  
documents	  as	  well	  as	  observations	  and	  interviews	  in	  the	  field	  with	  officials	  in	  national	  mining	  and	  
environment	  ministries,	  local	  government	  departments,	  donor	  agencies,	  UN	  organisations,	  NGOs,	  
mining	  companies,	  artisanal	  miners	  and	  other	  constituents	  in	  rural	  mining	  areas,	  supplemented	  by	  
research	  literature	  reviews	  across	  other	  sectors.	  
	   	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	   As	  Mohan	  and	  Stokke	  (2000)	  argue,	  dominant	  narratives	  of	  ‘local’	  development	  challenges,	  in	  multiple	  sectors	  of	  
development,	  ‘tend	  to	  underplay	  both	  local	  inequalities	  and	  power	  relations	  as	  well	  as	  national	  and	  transnational	  
economic	  and	  political	  forces’	  (p.	  247).	  
	  3	  
2. Reconceptualising	  formalisation:	  Win–win	  
narratives	  and	  ‘ordered,	  gridlike	  spaces’	  
	  
While	  the	  ‘formalisation’	  doctrine	  –	  the	  idea	  that	  informal	  economies	  needed	  to	  be	  brought	  into	  the	  
formal	  sector	  and	  regulated	  –	  began	  to	  ascend	  as	  a	  priority	  on	  the	  agenda	  of	  international	  
development	  agencies	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s,	  this	  doctrine	  emerged	  initially	  to	  reform	  
economic	  sectors	  such	  as	  agriculture	  and	  manufacturing,	  whose	  labour	  problems	  had	  been	  widely	  
discussed	  by	  scholars	  and	  development	  analysts.4	  Believing	  the	  formalisation	  of	  property	  rights	  to	  be	  
a	  win–win	  situation,	  numerous	  global	  institutions,	  governments,	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  
(NGOs)	  and	  scholars	  have	  been	  part	  of	  an	  extensive	  global	  movement	  in	  recent	  years	  to	  encourage	  
and	  increase	  the	  regulation	  of	  environmental	  resources	  and	  to	  formalise	  economic	  sectors.	  One	  
example	  is	  the	  UN	  Commission	  on	  Legal	  Empowerment	  of	  the	  Poor,	  created	  to	  spearhead	  efforts	  at	  
property	  rights	  registration	  and	  implementation	  and	  led	  by	  Hernando	  De	  Soto;	  this	  initiative	  was	  
recently	  critiqued	  by	  Cousins	  (2009)	  for	  downplaying	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  ‘redistribution’	  of	  rights,	  
creating	  a	  narrow	  legalistic	  vision	  of	  ‘empowerment’.	  In	  the	  mining	  sector,	  policymakers’	  enthusiasm	  
for	  formalisation	  led	  to	  various	  new	  global	  initiatives	  in	  the	  2000s,	  such	  as	  the	  Extractive	  Industries	  
Transparency	  Initiative	  and	  the	  Kimberley	  Process	  Certification	  Scheme,	  both	  of	  which	  were	  
developed	  with	  broad	  support	  from	  national	  governments,	  NGOs	  and	  multinational	  mining	  
companies	  to	  uphold	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  formalise	  economic	  activity	  related	  to	  resource	  extraction	  
(Maconachie,	  2009).	  	  
	  
In	  much	  of	  the	  global	  development	  policy	  literature,	  the	  alternative	  to	  formalisation	  is	  not	  
understood	  merely	  as	  inefficiency	  and	  a	  missed	  opportunity;	  rather,	  in	  many	  cases,	  the	  alternative	  is	  
understood	  as	  nothing	  less	  than	  disorder	  and	  anarchy.5	  However,	  while	  fear	  of	  anarchy	  may	  play	  a	  
part	  in	  theory-­‐building,	  the	  global	  enthusiasm	  behind	  ‘formalisation’	  policy	  prescriptions	  can	  be	  
attributed	  to	  multiple	  rationalisations	  beyond	  simply	  a	  fear	  of	  anarchy.	  Anderson	  and	  Huggins	  (2003)	  
contend	  that	  ‘sustainable	  development,	  if	  it	  can	  be	  defined,	  is	  only	  possible	  in	  a	  legal	  system	  where	  
property	  rights	  are	  well	  defined,	  enforced,	  and	  transferable’	  (p.	  58).	  They	  argue	  that	  ‘[p]roperty	  
rights	  provide	  the	  structure	  that	  encourages	  development,	  innovation,	  conservation,	  and	  discovery	  
of	  new	  resources’	  (p.	  58),	  suggesting	  that	  both	  environmental	  and	  social	  goals	  are	  attained	  through	  
formalisation	  processes.	  As	  Dyal-­‐Chand	  (2007)	  notes,	  ‘De	  Soto’s	  is	  a	  conservative	  claim	  that,	  after	  
some	  initial	  governmental	  intervention	  in	  the	  form	  of	  registration	  of	  property	  rights,	  the	  market	  will	  
function	  properly	  by	  allowing	  the	  poor	  to	  accumulate	  wealth’	  (p.	  62).	  Responding	  to	  what	  Platteau	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	   Tokman	  (2007)	  examines	  international	  agencies’	  responses	  to	  informal	  sector	  livelihoods	  and	  describe	  a	  1972	  report	  by	  
the	  International	  Labour	  Organization	  as	  a	  catalyst	  for	  focus	  on	  informal	  sector	  programmes	  among	  development	  
institutions.	  This	  focus	  on	  formalisation	  was	  initially	  seen	  as	  a	  rejoinder	  to	  the	  modernisation	  school	  of	  development	  
theory	  that	  flourished	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s,	  which	  held	  that	  traditional	  forms	  of	  labour	  would	  be	  phased	  out	  as	  a	  
consequence	  of	  economic	  progress	  in	  developing	  countries;	  this	  assumption	  proved	  to	  be	  false,	  and	  the	  informal	  sector	  
lexicon	  was	  instituted	  in	  recognition	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  informal	  sector	  workforces	  were	  not	  only	  persisting	  but	  also	  expanding	  
in	  many	  regions.	  De	  Soto’s	  books	  The	  Other	  Path	  (1989)	  and	  Mystery	  of	  Capital	  (2000)	  are	  often	  regarded	  as	  two	  of	  the	  
most	  influential	  books	  on	  the	  informal	  economy.	  
5	   For	  example,	  De	  Soto	  writes	  at	  one	  point	  in	  Mystery	  of	  Capital	  that	  ‘the	  only	  real	  choice	  for	  the	  governments	  of	  these	  
nations	  is	  whether	  they	  are	  going	  to	  integrate	  those	  resources	  into	  an	  orderly	  and	  coherent	  legal	  framework	  or	  continue	  to	  
live	  in	  anarchy’	  (2000,	  p.	  27).	  
4	  
(1996)	  calls	  the	  ‘evolutionary	  theory	  of	  land	  rights’,6	  Bromley	  (2008)	  contends	  that	  emphasis	  has	  
been	  misplaced	  in	  mainstream	  thinking	  about	  land	  formalisation,	  as	  ‘formalization	  offers	  little	  
assurance	  that	  beneficial	  outcomes	  are	  inevitable’	  (p.	  20).	  	  
	  
In	  critical	  development	  studies,	  an	  analytic	  framing	  that	  has	  garnered	  considerable	  interest	  is	  that	  of	  
Timothy	  Mitchell,	  who	  examines	  formalisation	  of	  peasant	  labour	  activities	  as	  a	  key	  element	  of	  the	  
‘colonial’	  enterprise	  (Mitchell,	  1991).	  He	  focuses	  on	  global	  and	  domestic	  power	  dynamics	  in	  the	  
colonisation	  in	  Egypt,	  where	  foreign	  experts	  imposed	  development	  ideologies	  based	  on	  ‘the	  peculiar	  
methods	  of	  order	  and	  truth	  that	  characterize	  the	  modern	  West’	  (Mitchell,	  1991,	  ix).	  Mitchell’s	  
meticulous	  analysis	  of	  the	  ‘invention	  and	  reinvention	  of	  the	  peasant’	  (Mitchell,	  2002,	  p.	  123)	  
portrays	  an	  ‘unnatural’	  colonial	  culture	  of	  global	  capitalist	  expansion,	  a	  culture	  that	  was	  premised	  
upon	  ‘disciplining’	  peasants	  (in	  the	  much-­‐researched	  Foucauldian	  sense	  of	  ‘disciplining’)	  by	  imposing	  
foreign	  ideas	  about	  universal	  property	  rights	  regimes.	  The	  principle	  of	  private	  property,	  he	  explains,	  
‘justified	  a	  violent	  exercise	  of	  power,	  and	  in	  fact	  was	  established	  by	  this	  violence’.7	  James	  Ferguson	  
(2007)	  extends	  Mitchell’s	  arguments	  while	  assessing	  post-­‐colonial	  development	  agendas.	  He	  
stresses	  that	  practices	  of	  modern	  development,	  driven	  by	  neo-­‐liberal	  ideologies	  that	  prioritise	  global	  
capital	  investment,	  reinforce	  elite	  knowledge	  and	  expertise	  as	  development	  solutions	  in	  ways	  that	  
give	  poorer	  communities	  little	  political	  say.	  Labour	  regulations	  have	  been	  repeatedly	  designed	  
according	  to	  the	  dictates	  of	  neo-­‐liberal	  ideology,	  he	  argues,	  where	  global	  blueprints	  are	  imposed	  as	  
development	  solutions	  with	  highly	  inequitable	  implications.	  Ferguson’s	  work	  rethinks	  urban	  
formalisation	  regimes	  in	  South	  Africa	  as	  regimes	  that	  were	  doomed	  from	  the	  outset	  by	  attempting	  
to	  create	  ‘ordered,	  gridlike	  spaces	  of	  hygiene	  and	  political	  order’	  (Ferguson,	  2007,	  p.	  72)	  in	  places	  
where	  ‘disdain,	  mistrust,	  and	  even	  loathing’	  (Ferguson,	  2007,	  p.	  72)	  characterised	  a	  dominant	  
relationship	  between	  policymakers	  and	  planners	  on	  one	  side	  and	  people	  living	  in	  informal	  
settlements	  on	  the	  other.8	  Some	  of	  these	  arguments	  prove	  highly	  relevant	  to	  the	  rural	  sectors	  under	  
discussion,	  where	  formalisation	  problems	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  diverse	  ways	  in	  different	  socio-­‐
political	  contexts.	  
	   	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	   Platteau	  (1996)	  argues	  that	  the	  dominant	  framework	  employed	  by	  mainstream	  economists	  to	  understand	  land	  tenure	  
challenges	  in	  poorer	  countries	  is	  ‘the	  evolutionary	  theory	  of	  land	  rights’	  (p.	  29)	  –	  a	  theory	  that	  assumes	  that	  societies	  
evolve	  towards	  private	  individual	  ownership	  of	  land	  in	  an	  equitable	  fashion	  over	  time	  and	  that	  this	  evolution	  is	  a	  necessary	  
step	  for	  development.	  Platteau	  critiques	  World	  Bank	  policies	  that	  adhere	  to	  this	  theory	  and	  argues	  that	  ‘there	  is	  a	  great	  
risk	  that	  the	  adjudication/registration	  process	  will	  be	  manipulated	  by	  the	  elite	  to	  its	  advantage’	  (1996,	  p.	  43).	  
7	   Mitchell	  writes	  in	  particular	  of	  the	  inequalities	  of	  land	  rights	  acquisition,	  stating,	  ‘The	  virtues	  of	  a	  universal	  right	  of	  
private	  property	  were	  articulated	  to	  support	  seizing	  land	  by	  force	  in	  North	  Africa.	  The	  land	  could	  be	  taken	  because	  those	  
who	  farmed	  it	  had	  not	  heard	  of	  this	  universal	  right.	  The	  principle	  of	  property	  was	  presented	  as	  the	  opposite	  of	  arbitrary	  
power	  or	  coercion,	  represented	  by	  the	  state	  ownership	  of	  land;	  but	  it	  justified	  a	  violent	  exercise	  of	  power,	  and	  in	  fact	  was	  
established	  by	  this	  violence’	  (Mitchell,	  2002,	  p.	  56).	  
8	   In	  an	  essay	  titled	  ‘Formalities	  of	  Poverty’,	  Ferguson	  (2007)	  examines	  transitions	  in	  post-­‐colonial	  urban	  formalisation	  
regimes	  in	  South	  Africa’s	  informal	  sectors,	  noting,	  ‘Where	  modernist	  urban	  planning	  sought	  to	  establish	  ordered,	  gridlike	  
spaces	  of	  hygiene	  and	  political	  order,	  it	  inevitably	  encountered	  actual	  urban	  realities	  that	  included	  spontaneously	  
constructed	  and	  often	  illegal	  zones	  of	  shacks,	  slums,	  shanties,	  and	  “squatters”’	  (p.	  72).	  Later	  in	  the	  article,	  in	  what	  
Ferguson	  identifies	  as	  a	  recent	  turn	  in	  paradigm	  adjustment,	  he	  describes	  emerging	  institutional	  perspectives	  on	  planning	  
in	  which	  ‘the	  informal	  economy	  is	  not	  to	  be	  overcome	  or	  incorporated,	  but	  enhanced	  and	  expanded’	  (p.	  83);	  Ferguson	  calls	  
this	  a	  ‘striking	  vision	  of	  the	  future,	  in	  which	  the	  informal	  economy	  is	  the	  new,	  exciting	  growth	  sector’	  (p.	  83).	  (Such	  a	  vision	  
of	  the	  future	  thus	  calls	  attention	  to	  emerging	  possibilities	  for	  policy	  paradigms	  to	  explicitly	  target	  informal	  activities,	  but	  he	  
notes	  that	  even	  the	  visualised	  policy	  models	  for	  this	  shift	  have	  been	  subject	  to	  capitalistic	  neo-­‐liberal	  visions	  of	  modern	  
progress.)	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3. Formalisation	  and	  the	  ‘national’	  scale	  as	  a	  
subjective	  scale	  
	  
3.1. Scaling	  the	  formalisation	  debate:	  Rural	  sectors	  in	  the	  contested	  logics	  
of	  the	  central	  state	  
A	  central	  contention	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  that	  the	  benefits	  –	  and	  inequalities	  –	  of	  ‘formalisation’	  
paradigms	  can	  vary	  when	  power	  is	  centralised,	  decentralised	  and	  recentralised.	  Doreen	  Massey’s	  
influential	  (Massey,	  1979,	  p.	  233)	  question,	  ‘In	  what	  sense	  are	  “regional”	  problems	  regional	  
problems?’,	  can	  be	  usefully	  applied	  to	  contemporary	  work	  on	  geographical	  scale	  by	  posing	  the	  
question:	  ‘In	  what	  sense	  are	  “national”	  formalisation	  problems	  national	  formalisation	  problems?’	  
Examining	  this	  question	  requires	  attention	  to	  the	  definitional	  debates	  about	  formalisation	  as	  a	  
bureaucratic	  endeavour	  as	  well	  as	  scalar	  constructions	  (e.g.	  regulation	  as	  a	  ‘regional’/’national’	  
endeavour).	  
	  
Hilson	  (2007)	  analysed	  the	  notion	  of	  formalization	  in	  the	  ASM	  sector	  as	  a	  challenge	  of	  national	  law	  
and	  implementation,	  using	  the	  definition	  given	  by	  Lowe	  (2005):	  “Formalization	  speaks	  not	  only	  to	  
the	  presence	  of	  legislation,	  but	  to	  the	  activation	  and	  enforcement	  of	  it	  by	  authorities	  and	  the	  extent	  
of	  their	  success”	  (Lowe,	  2005,	  p.	  13).	  This	  interpretation	  of	  formalisation	  suggests	  that	  formalisation	  
can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  double-­‐faced	  notion,	  where,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  policies	  may	  exist	  to	  support	  
economies	  in	  formal	  terms	  and,	  on	  the	  other,	  ‘activation’	  and	  ‘enforcement’	  of	  policy	  goals	  may	  be	  
influenced	  by	  a	  range	  of	  factors	  and	  where	  ‘success’	  can	  be	  politically	  contentious.	  While	  De	  Soto’s	  
vision	  of	  ‘formalisation’	  has	  become	  a	  particularly	  fashionable	  point	  of	  focus	  among	  policymakers	  
given	  his	  technical	  and	  depoliticised	  vision	  of	  property	  rights,	  ‘success’	  in	  formalisation	  
implementation	  may	  be	  far	  from	  a	  ‘win–win’	  situation	  for	  society.	  As	  Mitchell	  argues,	  national	  
formalisation	  efforts	  in	  Peru	  enabled	  wealthier	  classes	  of	  citizens	  to	  benefit	  –	  particularly	  
entrepreneurial	  speculators	  –	  rather	  than	  poorer	  small-­‐scale	  producers.	  The	  win–win	  narrative	  is	  
further	  troubled	  by	  the	  trend	  towards	  national	  policy	  supremacy	  in	  stimulating	  market-­‐friendly	  
conditions,	  rather	  than	  local	  government	  autonomy	  in	  working	  to	  address	  the	  regional	  dynamics	  of	  
rural	  livelihood	  planning.	  In	  several	  sectors,	  international	  policy	  conferences	  and	  intergovernmental	  
sessions	  facilitated	  by	  UN	  organisations	  and	  World	  Bank	  projects	  have	  prioritised	  national-­‐scale	  
governance	  structures	  rather	  than	  local	  governance	  structures.	  For	  example,	  a	  range	  of	  UN	  and	  
World	  Bank	  projects	  designed	  to	  address	  the	  small-­‐scale	  mining	  sector	  have	  focused	  on	  what	  
national	  governments	  can	  do	  to	  regulate	  the	  mining	  sector	  (e.g.	  Spiegel	  and	  Veiga,	  2010).	  In	  the	  
research	  that	  led	  to	  this	  paper,	  I	  attended	  more	  than	  30	  UN	  and	  World	  Bank	  conferences	  on	  small-­‐
scale	  mining	  issues	  where	  national	  government	  actors	  participated	  but	  local	  government	  actors	  did	  
not.	  In	  many	  cases,	  World	  Bank	  and	  UN	  project	  budgets	  were	  heavily	  vested	  in	  flying	  in	  government	  
officials	  across	  continents	  to	  create	  a	  dialogue	  that	  focused	  on	  the	  roles	  of	  national	  governments	  in	  
relation	  to	  local	  populations	  while	  by-­‐passing	  the	  issue	  of	  local	  governance	  structures.	  
	  
Tacconi	  (2007)	  offers	  a	  framework	  for	  analysing	  decentralisation	  in	  the	  context	  of	  governing	  forests	  
and	  livelihoods,	  arguing	  that	  theories	  of	  decentralisation	  have	  been	  ‘underdeveloped’	  and	  that	  the	  
‘design	  of	  decentralized	  forest	  management	  can	  benefit	  from	  further	  development	  of	  the	  theory	  in	  
order	  to	  clearly	  outline	  the	  potential	  causal	  relationships	  among	  the	  many	  variables	  involved’	  
(p.	  338).	  Figure	  1	  provides	  a	  slightly	  adapted	  representation	  of	  his	  framework	  to	  highlight	  the	  
6	  
prioritisation	  of	  donors	  and	  global	  institutions	  in	  relation	  to	  central	  government	  power	  dynamics	  




Figure	  1.	   Perspective	  of	  decentralisation	  and	  central	  government	  roles	  in	  resource	  governance	  
Adapted	  from	  Tacconi	  (2007)	  
	  
	  
In	  the	  figure,	  the	  differentiated	  economic	  logics	  of	  ‘economic	  growth’	  and	  ‘livelihoods’	  need	  not	  
necessarily	  be	  seen	  as	  constitutive	  of	  a	  gap	  that	  is	  systematically	  more	  entrenched	  in	  the	  official	  
decision-­‐making	  politics	  of	  central	  governments	  compared	  with	  local-­‐level	  decision-­‐making.	  
However,	  a	  number	  of	  studies	  reveal	  that	  national	  authorities	  have	  gravitated	  towards	  resource	  
capture	  efforts	  even	  after	  decentralisation	  policies	  are	  supposedly	  enacted,	  subverting	  democratic	  
opportunities	  for	  governing	  livelihoods	  and	  environments.	  Ribot	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  discuss	  how	  ‘central	  
governments	  in	  six	  countries	  –	  Senegal,	  Uganda,	  Nepal,	  Indonesia,	  Bolivia,	  and	  Nicaragua	  –	  use	  a	  
variety	  of	  strategies	  to	  obstruct	  the	  democratic	  decentralization	  of	  resource	  management	  and,	  
hence,	  retain	  central	  control’	  (p.	  1864).	  Cerutti	  and	  Tacconi	  (2008)	  provide	  further	  evidence	  of	  how	  
central	  states	  (e.g.	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Cameroon)	  fail	  to	  make	  regional	  distinctions	  between	  situations	  of	  
informal	  and	  illicit	  livelihoods,	  subsuming	  both	  categories	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  ‘illegality’.	  
	  
In	  a	  similar	  spirit,	  a	  range	  of	  studies	  focused	  in	  Indonesia	  and	  Zimbabwe	  have	  cautioned	  about	  the	  
premature	  rejection	  of	  decentralised	  governance	  structures	  and	  the	  reassertion	  of	  central	  power.	  
Obidzinski	  (2004)	  cautions	  that,	  in	  the	  early	  period	  of	  decentralisation	  in	  Indonesia,	  five	  years	  after	  
the	  1999	  Autonomy	  Laws,	  national	  authorities	  had	  not	  fully	  empowered	  local	  district	  institutions	  to	  
sustainably	  manage	  resources,	  noting	  that	  ‘decentralization	  in	  the	  forestry	  sector	  is	  being	  presented	  
as	  a	  failure’	  and	  that	  ‘[p]ronouncing	  that	  a	  new	  system	  of	  governance	  has	  failed	  assumes	  that	  the	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new	  system	  has	  been	  fully	  implemented,	  and	  that	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  causal	  relationship	  between	  
current	  policy	  outcomes	  and	  the	  new	  system’	  (p.	  3).	  While	  discourses	  of	  local	  failure	  can	  serve	  the	  
interests	  of	  national	  elites	  who	  may	  aim	  to	  reassert	  control,	  they	  also	  become	  increasingly	  contested	  
when	  economic	  situations	  create	  new	  pressures.	  Various	  studies	  suggest	  that	  Zimbabwe’s	  
‘decentralisation’	  paradigms	  for	  rural	  environmental	  resource	  management	  in	  the	  1990s	  ultimately	  
failed	  on	  account	  of	  not	  only	  local	  district	  capacity	  issues	  but	  also	  power	  dynamics	  relating	  to	  both	  
national	  and	  global	  institutional	  decision-­‐making.	  CAMPFIRE,	  the	  Communal	  Areas	  Management	  
Programme	  for	  Indigenous	  Resources,	  is	  a	  programme	  for	  decentralised	  wildlife	  management,	  one	  
that	  ostensibly	  was	  designed	  to	  empower	  Rural	  District	  Councils.	  Balint	  and	  Mashinya	  (2006)	  argue	  
that	  ‘withdrawal	  of	  outside	  agencies	  responsible	  for	  oversight	  and	  assistance’	  had	  a	  considerable	  
influence	  on	  the	  failed	  CAMPFIRE	  devolution	  model,	  as	  did	  failure	  of	  local	  leadership	  and	  national	  
governance	  deterioration	  (p.	  805),	  providing	  a	  multi-­‐scalar	  analysis	  that	  invites	  attention	  to	  the	  
fragility	  of	  local	  governance	  support	  structures.	  
	  
3.2. Interpreting	  challenges	  in	  small-­‐scale	  mining:	  Visions	  of	  informalisation	  
versus	  illegality	  
In	  recent	  years,	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  various	  governments	  have	  promoted	  the	  notion	  that	  artisanal	  
and	  small-­‐scale	  mining	  (ASM)	  –	  usually	  understood	  as	  low-­‐tech	  mineral	  extraction	  involving	  limited	  
or	  no	  economic	  capital	  investment	  –	  should	  be	  formalised	  (USAID,	  2010).	  This	  position	  sounds	  well	  
intentioned,	  but	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  quite	  paradoxical	  once	  it	  is	  recognised	  that	  miners	  would	  need	  to	  
have	  incentives	  to	  register,	  and	  such	  incentives	  would	  likely	  require	  some	  degree	  of	  government	  
capacity	  for	  adapting	  to	  the	  diverse	  concerns	  of	  unlicensed	  miners.	  More	  than	  90%	  of	  the	  world’s	  
ASM	  population	  operates	  without	  licences	  (Hinton,	  2006).	  The	  idea	  that	  miners	  should	  self-­‐register,	  
although	  perhaps	  useful,	  is	  not	  a	  solution	  that	  can	  be	  conceptually	  divorced	  from	  broader	  debates	  
about	  institutional	  responsibilities	  (across	  multiple	  scales)	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  benefits	  accruing	  to	  
miners	  are	  equitably	  and	  effectively	  distributed.	  Table	  1	  lists	  some	  of	  the	  numerous	  complexities	  
that	  inhibit	  legislative	  mechanisms	  for	  tackling	  the	  issue	  of	  ASM.	  
 
Table	  1.	   The	  balance	  of	  arguments	  for	  formalising	  ASM:	  Common	  arguments	  
Adapted	  from	  Hentschel	  et	  al.	  (2002)	   	  
Demand	  mechanisms	  for	  formally	  legalising	  ASM	   Obstacle	  mechanisms	  that	  inhibit	  ASM	  legalisation	  
Existing	  mining	  code	  and	  environmental	  laws	  can	  help	  
communities	  
Tradition	  of	  miners	  to	  operate	  individually	  and	  without	  
seeking	  permits	  
Enforcement	  of	  laws,	  regulations	  and	  standards	  by	  the	  
authorities	  
Illiteracy	  of	  miners	  
Possibilities	  that	  formal	  large-­‐	  and	  medium-­‐scale	  
operations	  will	  drive	  informal	  miners	  out	  of	  their	  
mining	  sites	  
Access	  to	  concessions	  is	  limited	  especially	  in	  mineral-­‐
rich	  areas	  
Passage	  of	  pending	  legislation	   Rare	  visits	  and	  inspections	  of	  ASM	  mines	  
Local	  pressures	  for	  improved	  environmental	  
performance	  
Miners	  feel	  there	  is	  little	  difference	  between	  being	  
legal	  and	  illegal	  
Danger	  of	  being	  subject	  to	  extortion	   Costly	  and	  difficult	  procedure	  to	  gain	  and	  maintain	  
legal	  status	  
Initiatives	  among	  firms:	  shift	  to	  legalisation	  and	  
environmental	  self-­‐regulation	  
Miners’	  fear	  of	  being	  taxed	  fully	  if	  legalised	  
Requirement	  to	  sell	  minerals	  to	  certain	  agents	  
(whether	  legal	  or	  illegal)	  	  
Free	  access	  to	  most	  convenient	  buying	  agents	  (incl.	  
non-­‐licensed)	  as	  informal	  enterprise	  
Formalisation	  creates	  opportunities	  for	  development	  
agencies	  to	  assist	  workers	  
Informality	  helps	  to	  maintain	  flexibility	  in	  shifting	  from	  
one	  mining	  site	  to	  another	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Much	  of	  the	  scholarship	  addressing	  unlicensed	  mining	  has	  a	  tendency	  to	  portray	  small-­‐scale	  
mineworkers	  indiscriminately	  as	  irresponsible	  and	  ‘predatory’	  (Laurance,	  2005,	  p.	  645)	  while	  
recommending	  that	  national	  governments	  eliminate	  unlicensed	  extraction.	  The	  law	  is	  frequently	  
treated	  as	  an	  unproblematic	  tool	  for	  solving	  an	  obvious	  social	  ill.	  To	  tackle	  unlicensed	  ASM,	  
implementation	  of	  existing	  legislation	  is	  often	  perceived	  as	  a	  priority,	  and	  academic	  journals	  have	  
published	  an	  extensive	  array	  of	  studies	  that	  urge	  the	  introduction	  of	  strict	  regulations,	  sometimes	  
with	  titles	  of	  peer-­‐reviewed	  articles	  decrying	  ‘illegal	  mining’	  (e.g.	  ‘Influence	  of	  illegal	  gold	  mining	  on	  
mercury	  levels	  in	  fish	  in	  North	  Sulawesi,	  Indonesia’9).	  It	  is	  only	  relatively	  recently	  that	  an	  opposing	  
force	  in	  the	  scholarly	  community	  has	  begun	  to	  emerge,	  one	  that	  recognises	  ASM	  as	  ‘a	  magnetic	  
force	  in	  rural	  labor	  markets’	  (Bryceson	  and	  Jonsson,	  2010,	  p.	  379)	  and	  an	  ‘employment	  engine’	  
(Hilson	  and	  Banchirigah,	  2009,	  p.	  184).	  Within	  this	  community,	  unlicensed	  ASM	  is	  seen	  as	  an	  activity	  
that	  can	  contribute	  to	  rural	  development	  in	  positive	  ways,	  despite	  its	  informality	  and	  sometimes	  
because	  of	  its	  informality.	  For	  some	  writers	  in	  this	  group,	  unlicensed	  ASM	  is	  not	  dismissed	  negatively	  
as	  anarchic	  and	  illegal,	  but	  rather,	  it	  is	  understood	  as	  work	  that	  has	  logic	  within	  the	  informal	  sector,	  
where	  poorer	  workers’	  attempts	  to	  resist	  deep	  marginalisation	  serve	  as	  a	  livelihood	  or	  survival	  
strategy	  that	  should	  be	  ‘nurtured’	  and	  allowed	  to	  ‘flourish’	  (Tschakert,	  2009,	  p.	  24).	  
	  
It	  is	  in	  recognition	  of	  the	  excessive	  rigidity	  in	  regulatory	  frameworks	  that	  Hilson	  and	  Banchirigah	  
(2009),	  Tschakert	  (2009)	  and	  others	  have	  emphasised	  a	  growing	  need	  for	  more	  studies	  on	  the	  
institutional	  complexities	  of	  formalisation.	  Sinding	  (2005),	  discussing	  this	  need,	  explains	  that	  
perceptions	  of	  law	  matter	  a	  great	  deal	  and	  that	  mineral	  tenure	  systems	  must	  ‘be	  seen	  to	  be	  
equitable,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  artisanal	  miners	  must	  believe	  that	  they	  can	  get	  to	  the	  local	  or	  regional	  
office	  that	  awards	  mineral	  tenure	  and	  that	  their	  claim	  to	  a	  particular	  piece	  of	  land	  will	  be	  swiftly	  
granted	  and	  recorded’	  (p.	  249).	  Siegel	  and	  Veiga	  (2009)	  offer	  an	  optimistic	  concept	  of	  formalisation	  
in	  similar	  fashion,	  stating	  that	  formalisation	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  ‘the	  means	  of	  absorbing	  existing	  
customary	  practices—developed	  informally	  by	  miners—into	  the	  mainstream	  of	  a	  country’s	  legal	  and	  
economic	  affairs’	  (p.	  51).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Siegel	  and	  Veiga	  (2009)	  acknowledge	  that	  formalisation	  
can	  sometimes	  be	  seen	  as	  ‘imperial’	  (p.	  53).	  They	  also	  recognise	  that	  formalisation	  can	  be	  expensive	  
to	  facilitate	  due	  to	  high	  costs	  for	  licensing	  and	  bureaucratic	  procedures.	  This	  point	  is	  also	  made	  by	  
Clausen	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  who	  note	  that	  formal	  licensing	  might	  still	  simultaneously	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  necessity	  
in	  situations	  where	  the	  absence	  of	  legally	  recognised	  resource	  rights	  impedes	  locally	  desired	  
development	  trajectories.	  
	  
Yet,	  as	  the	  meanings	  and	  processes	  of	  formalisation	  are	  disputed,	  formalisation	  can	  be	  seen,	  
ultimately,	  to	  be	  whatever	  state	  governments	  define	  as	  key	  in	  order	  to	  encourage,	  pressure	  or	  force	  
unlicensed	  miners	  to	  adhere	  to	  laws.	  A	  growing	  body	  of	  scholarship	  documents	  how	  police	  and	  
military	  strategies	  to	  control	  illegal	  mining,	  particularly	  in	  Africa,	  are	  core	  features	  of	  formalisation	  
doctrines,	  as	  these	  are	  commonly	  prioritised	  state	  mechanisms	  for	  enforcing	  the	  principles	  of	  private	  
property	  and	  legal	  statutes	  on	  resource	  management.	  While	  these	  trends	  are	  extensively	  
documented,	  for	  instance,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  national	  government	  policing	  efforts	  in	  Ghana	  (Hilson	  
and	  Yakovleva,	  2007;	  Bush,	  2009)	  and	  Angola	  (Le	  Billon,	  2008),	  Zimbabwe	  and	  Indonesia	  provide	  
particularly	  important	  and	  timely	  case	  studies	  for	  investigating	  global	  narratives	  of	  formal	  law	  and	  
order	  in	  the	  mining	  sector.	  
	   	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	   Kambey	  et	  al.	  (2001)	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4. Case	  study:	  Contested	  ‘formalisation’	  policy	  
in	  small-­‐scale	  mining	  communities	  in	  
Zimbabwe	  
	  
The	  formal	  regulation	  of	  mining	  has	  long	  been	  recognised	  as	  an	  important	  component	  of	  
Zimbabwe’s	  development.	  One	  of	  the	  key	  enduring	  legacies	  of	  colonisation	  was	  the	  prioritisation	  of	  
mining	  as	  a	  central	  pillar	  in	  the	  national	  economy	  (Hollaway,	  1997).	  Zwane	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  observe	  that	  
‘the	  Mines	  and	  Minerals	  Act	  [developed	  initially	  under	  colonial	  rule]	  remains	  the	  most	  powerful	  
legislation’,	  such	  that	  mining	  laws	  continue	  to	  override	  policies	  for	  other	  resource	  sectors	  and	  in	  
other	  institutions	  (e.g.	  agriculture,	  tourism,	  etc.).	  They	  note	  how,	  historically,	  and	  largely	  as	  a	  legacy	  
of	  colonisation	  processes	  led	  by	  Cecil	  Rhodes,	  mining	  interests	  have	  been	  given	  priority	  status	  in	  
land	  disputes	  –	  particularly	  along	  the	  Great	  Dyke,	  a	  geological	  feature	  that	  runs	  north/south	  through	  
Zimbabwe,	  where	  95%	  of	  mineral-­‐rich	  areas	  are	  under	  concession	  by	  large	  and	  medium-­‐scale	  
companies	  (Zimbabwe	  Miners	  Federation,	  2007).	  Economic	  Structural	  Adjustment	  Programmes	  
(ESAPs)	  implemented	  by	  the	  Government	  of	  Zimbabwe	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  
continued	  to	  prioritise	  mining.	  ESAPs	  explicitly	  included	  a	  policy	  agenda	  that	  created	  a	  favourable	  
climate	  for	  foreign	  mining	  investment	  in	  order	  to	  boost	  economic	  growth,	  and	  this	  growth	  would,	  it	  
was	  hoped,	  lead	  to	  equitable	  development	  in	  rural	  areas.	  As	  Chifamba	  (2002)	  observes,	  the	  
‘liberalized’	  structure	  of	  Zimbabwe’s	  mining	  industry	  manifested	  as	  an	  ‘oligopolistic	  mining	  industry’	  
that	  favoured	  foreign	  companies	  instead	  of	  indigenous	  workers.	  Dreschler	  (2001)	  has	  likewise	  noted	  
that	  Zimbabwe’s	  mineral	  industry	  ‘is	  dominated	  by	  large	  mining	  companies’	  (p.	  157)	  even	  though	  
ASM	  involves	  a	  larger	  labour	  force.	  
	  
However,	  notwithstanding	  that	  most	  of	  the	  country’s	  mineral	  titles	  remain	  owned	  by	  large	  
companies	  and	  not	  small-­‐scale	  mineworkers,	  it	  is	  still	  widely	  recognised	  –	  in	  international	  literature	  
on	  small-­‐scale	  mining	  –	  that	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  the	  Government	  of	  Zimbabwe	  took	  a	  series	  of	  
proactive	  measures	  to	  support	  and	  legally	  recognise	  indigenous	  ASM	  populations.	  In	  1993,	  the	  
‘Harare	  Guidelines	  on	  Small-­‐Scale	  Mining’	  became	  an	  exemplary	  illustration	  of	  forward-­‐thinking	  
governmental	  approaches	  for	  poverty-­‐reduction-­‐oriented	  development	  assistance	  for	  ASM	  workers;	  
these	  guidelines	  have	  been	  heralded	  as	  a	  useful	  model	  around	  the	  world,	  referenced	  in	  literature	  on	  
ASM	  across	  Africa	  (Dreschler,	  2001;	  Hinton,	  2006)	  and	  even	  in	  research	  literature	  discussing	  mining	  
policy	  options	  in	  Asia	  (Burke,	  2006).	  The	  policy	  vision	  expressed	  in	  the	  Harare	  Guidelines	  reflected	  
the	  vision	  shared	  by	  government	  agencies	  and	  development	  institutions	  to	  promote	  the	  legalisation	  
of	  ASM	  activity	  and	  recognise	  it	  as	  a	  poverty-­‐alleviation	  activity.	  With	  this	  vision,	  in	  the	  1990s,	  
international	  development	  institutions	  including	  German	  and	  Swedish	  donor	  agencies	  began	  to	  work	  
with	  the	  Government	  of	  Zimbabwe	  on	  development	  projects	  to	  encourage	  more	  sustainable	  ASM	  
activities.	  These	  collaborative	  initiatives	  tended	  to	  be	  technical	  in	  nature,	  combining	  the	  goals	  of	  
promoting	  safer	  environmental	  management	  and	  developing	  policies	  for	  ASM	  legalisation,	  with	  a	  
focus	  on	  two	  types	  of	  gold-­‐mining:	  alluvial	  gold	  panning	  in	  riverbeds	  and	  small-­‐scale	  primary	  ore	  
extraction	  on	  land.	  
	  
4.1. Decentralised	  policy	  approach	  for	  riverbed	  gold	  panning	  
In	  1991,	  after	  several	  international	  donor	  agencies	  became	  involved	  in	  Zimbabwe	  to	  address	  mining	  
policy	  developments,	  the	  Central	  Government	  of	  Zimbabwe	  legalised	  one	  of	  the	  more	  rudimentary	  
forms	  of	  artisanal	  gold-­‐mining:	  riverbed	  gold	  panning.	  Specifically,	  the	  government	  promulgated	  
10	  
Statutory	  Instrument	  275	  of	  1991	  (Alluvial	  Gold	  Panning	  in	  Public	  Streams).	  This	  statute	  created	  a	  
legalisation	  regime	  wherein	  local	  governments	  would	  issue	  licences	  to	  gold	  panners.	  Supporting	  gold	  
panners	  in	  this	  way	  was	  understood	  as	  the	  best	  means	  of	  controlling	  smuggling	  and	  mitigating	  
environmental	  risks;	  in	  addition,	  local	  governments	  had	  the	  duty	  of	  coordinating	  training	  centres,	  
which	  also	  served	  as	  gold-­‐marketing	  centres	  for	  panners.	  Maponga	  and	  Ngorima	  (2003)	  
optimistically	  explained	  that	  ecological	  challenges	  could	  be	  ‘overcome’	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  
‘legislation	  and	  education’	  measures	  that	  could	  help	  panners	  become	  licensed.	  Under	  Statutory	  
Instrument	  275,	  the	  central	  government	  authorised	  Rural	  District	  Councils	  to	  issue	  licences	  to	  
riverbed	  gold	  panners	  independently	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Mines	  and	  Mining	  Development.	  
	  
Although	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Mines	  and	  Mining	  Development	  also	  issued	  its	  own	  gold	  panning	  licences,	  
which	  in	  some	  cases	  led	  to	  confusion	  and	  overlap	  between	  central	  and	  local	  government	  licences,10	  
the	  significance	  of	  Statutory	  Instrument	  275	  was	  such	  that	  local	  government	  officers	  were	  able	  –	  for	  
the	  first	  time	  –	  to	  have	  autonomous	  licensing	  powers	  in	  the	  gold	  extraction	  sector.	  This	  not	  only	  
overturned	  the	  colonial	  legacy	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  district	  governments	  were	  being	  empowered	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  minerals	  development	  –	  a	  sector	  that	  was	  historically	  controlled	  by	  a	  small	  number	  of	  
centralised	  decision-­‐makers;	  it	  also	  overturned	  the	  colonial	  policies	  that	  forbade	  independent	  gold	  
extraction	  by	  black	  African	  workers.	  It	  also	  created	  a	  space	  for	  new	  kinds	  of	  international	  
development	  linkages.	  ITDG	  and	  SNV	  became	  active	  in	  providing	  technical	  assistance	  in	  Insiza	  
District	  (Figure	  2),	  with	  German	  consultants	  heading	  a	  programme	  focusing	  on	  educating	  panners	  on	  
ways	  of	  reducing	  siltation	  and	  minimising	  other	  ecological	  impacts.	  
	  
Researchers	  have	  suggested	  that	  education	  services	  for	  panners	  in	  Insiza	  District	  proved	  to	  be	  
particularly	  promising	  early	  on	  (Maponga	  and	  Ngorima,	  2003).	  Although	  other	  districts	  did	  not	  adopt	  
the	  same	  intensity	  in	  developing	  licensing	  and	  education	  programmes,	  and	  in	  fact	  most	  districts	  
failed	  to	  license	  the	  gold	  panners,11	  the	  Insiza	  District	  Council	  was	  widely	  seen	  as	  the	  most	  active	  
Rural	  District	  Council	  in	  managing	  licences	  for	  riverbed	  panning,	  one	  that	  other	  districts	  
should	  follow.12	  
	  
4.2. Policy	  approach	  for	  small-­‐scale	  primary	  ore	  mining	  
In	  addition	  to	  policy	  reforms	  for	  riverbed	  panning,	  other	  early	  indications	  that	  government	  
institutions	  were	  willing	  to	  work	  with	  informal	  workers	  proactively	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  how	  donors	  and	  
government	  engineers	  engaged	  with	  small-­‐scale	  gold	  reef	  miners	  (primary	  hard	  rock	  miners)	  to	  
create	  community	  mineral	  processing	  centres.	  As	  Hilson	  (2007)	  notes,	  ‘The	  Shamva	  Mining	  Centre	  in	  
Zimbabwe…was,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  its	  construction,	  heralded	  by	  many	  as	  the	  most	  significant	  support	  
service	  provided	  for	  small-­‐scale	  mining	  to	  date’	  (p.	  242).	  As	  one	  of	  the	  most	  widely	  cited	  examples	  of	  
an	  international	  donor-­‐funded	  project	  to	  set	  up	  a	  gold-­‐processing	  mill	  for	  ASM	  workers,	  Shamva	  was	  
viewed	  by	  researchers	  initially	  as	  a	  proactive	  step	  towards	  improving	  environmental	  management	  
and	  economic	  efficiency	  through	  technology-­‐sharing	  (Svotwa	  and	  Bugnosen,	  1993).	  Developed	  as	  an	  
idea	  by	  ITDG	  and	  GTZ	  in	  1989	  and	  further	  developed	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  a	  key	  goal	  of	  the	  Shamva	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	   Interview	  with	  Local	  Government	  Officer	  in	  Insiza	  District,	  April	  2009	  
11	   Interviews	  with	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Local	  Government	  Association,	  April,	  2009	  
12	   In	  most	  districts,	  district	  governments	  did	  not	  develop	  licensing	  policies	  for	  the	  riverbed	  panners	  at	  all,	  and	  left	  that	  
job	  strictly	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Mines	  and	  Mining	  Development.	  However,	  the	  Local	  Government	  Association	  had	  publicised	  
the	  successes	  of	  the	  Insiza	  District	  model	  and	  encouraged	  other	  districts	  to	  develop	  similar	  local	  management	  systems	  for	  
gold	  panning.	  
	  11	  
project	  was	  that	  central	  processing	  units	  could	  help	  bring	  illegal	  mining	  into	  a	  legal	  framework	  and	  
create	  a	  more	  centralised,	  organised	  and	  easily	  regulated	  way	  of	  processing	  gold;	  it	  was	  believed	  
that	  this	  could,	  in	  turn,	  help	  control	  mercury	  usage	  and	  facilitate	  access	  to	  more	  advanced	  
technology	  that	  would	  raise	  incomes.	  Shamva	  was	  heralded	  as	  a	  ‘best	  practice	  in	  small-­‐scale	  mining’	  
by	  the	  UN	  Economic	  Commission	  for	  Africa	  (UNECA,	  2002)	  in	  its	  early	  days	  and	  Hentschel	  et	  al.	  




Figure	  2.	   Location	  of	  insiza	  district	  and	  other	  gold	  panning	  areas	  
Source:	  Svotwa	  and	  Mtetwa	  (1997)	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Critical	  analyses	  of	  the	  Shamva	  project	  have	  called	  attention	  to	  multiple	  problems	  in	  the	  execution	  
of	  the	  development	  vision	  over	  the	  long	  term.	  This	  has	  been	  attributed,	  in	  part,	  to	  very	  high	  demand	  
for	  the	  milling	  services.	  Hilson	  (2007)	  explains	  that	  despite	  being	  originally	  ‘constructed	  to	  service	  
approximately	  40	  local	  gold	  miners’,	  actual	  demand	  for	  ore	  processing	  at	  the	  Shamva	  Mining	  Centre	  
soon	  exceeded	  ‘500	  small-­‐scale	  operations’	  (p.	  242).	  This	  excess	  demand,	  in	  turn,	  created	  lengthy	  
waiting	  times	  of	  up	  to	  six	  weeks	  to	  process	  ore.	  The	  failure	  to	  align	  the	  mill	  with	  local	  demand	  led	  to	  
disappointment	  among	  workers,	  and	  the	  long	  waiting	  times	  ultimately	  precipitated	  a	  reversion	  to	  
poor	  methods	  of	  mercury	  usage	  in	  the	  amalgamation	  process	  and	  created	  environmental	  and	  
human	  health	  problems	  (Hilson,	  2007).	  Mugova	  (2001),	  in	  a	  presentation	  to	  international	  donors,	  
blamed	  the	  national	  government	  for	  inadequate	  planning	  and	  insufficient	  support.	  Other	  critics	  have	  
suggested	  that	  foreign	  donors	  and	  government	  actors	  were	  too	  quick	  to	  transfer	  the	  management	  of	  
the	  milling	  centre	  to	  a	  local	  association	  of	  miners.	  As	  Dreschler	  (2001)	  contemplates	  while	  assessing	  
the	  Shamva	  experience,	  ‘there	  is	  need	  for	  development	  agencies	  to	  rethink	  whether	  it	  is	  always	  
necessary	  to	  hand	  over	  commercial	  projects	  to	  producers	  associations’	  (p.	  10).	  He	  further	  explains	  
the	  lessons	  from	  Shamva	  as	  follows:	  ‘Producers	  may	  well	  be	  better	  off	  to	  leave	  the	  management	  of	  
commercial	  projects	  to	  experienced	  and	  qualified	  managers	  while	  they	  enjoy	  an	  efficient	  and	  
competitively	  priced	  service.	  Great	  care	  has	  to	  be	  taken	  in	  working	  with	  associations	  to	  ensure	  that	  a	  
few	  powerful	  people	  in	  the	  association	  do	  not	  monopolise	  benefits	  created	  for	  individual	  
gain’	  (p.	  10).	  
	  
Better	  initial	  research	  by	  the	  development	  agencies,	  Hilson	  (2007)	  argued,	  could	  also	  have	  helped	  to	  
determine	  community-­‐specific	  needs	  and	  to	  avoid	  some	  of	  problems	  of	  excessive	  demand	  
encountered	  at	  Shamva.	  Ultimately,	  Shamva’s	  poor	  management	  not	  only	  created	  a	  scenario	  where	  
too	  many	  miners	  were	  waiting	  for	  gold	  processing	  and	  where	  distrust	  developed	  as	  a	  consequence;	  
the	  executive	  committee	  running	  the	  mill	  ultimately	  decided	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  make	  the	  mill	  
work	  would	  be	  to	  set	  a	  minimum	  amount	  of	  ore	  that	  miners	  had	  to	  bring	  in	  order	  to	  be	  eligible	  to	  
use	  the	  facility.	  Those	  bringing	  less	  than	  10	  tonnes	  of	  ore	  could	  have	  their	  ore	  milled	  only	  during	  
slack	  periods.	  This	  decision	  ultimately	  prevented	  poorer	  artisanal	  workers	  from	  benefiting	  from	  the	  
centre.	  According	  to	  interviewees	  who	  still	  mine	  for	  gold	  in	  the	  area	  and	  who	  recall	  the	  Shamva	  
Centre	  experience	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  there	  having	  been	  an	  opportunity	  lost,	  the	  mill	  centre’s	  
management	  was	  eventually	  shifted	  from	  donors	  to	  a	  group	  of	  ‘established’	  small-­‐scale	  miners	  who	  
were	  ‘not	  concerned’	  about	  the	  poorer	  workers.	  This	  eventually	  created	  distrust	  in	  the	  management	  
of	  the	  mill,	  which,	  over	  time,	  led	  to	  under-­‐utilisation	  and	  abandonment.13	  
	  
Interviews	  at	  other	  mills	  confirm	  that	  Shamva’s	  problem	  was	  not	  an	  isolated	  case.	  Similar	  criticisms	  
are	  expressed	  by	  mineworkers	  who	  were	  involved	  in	  other	  projects,	  who	  have	  argued	  that	  outsiders	  
(government	  agents,	  donors	  and	  foreign	  experts)	  need	  to	  be	  more	  sensitive	  to	  complexities	  of	  
miners’	  organisational	  structures	  when	  promoting	  labour	  formalisation	  and	  technology	  
improvement.	  Just	  as	  donors	  pulled	  out	  prematurely	  from	  the	  Shamva	  project,	  an	  EU-­‐funded	  gold	  
milling	  project	  in	  Insiza	  District	  suffered	  a	  similar	  fate.	  Confusion,	  mistrust	  and	  poor	  management	  at	  
mills	  are	  frequent	  concerns	  in	  the	  country’s	  gold-­‐milling	  sector;	  indeed,	  past	  literature	  has	  indicated	  
that	  relationships	  between	  miners	  and	  mill	  owners	  are	  particularly	  poor	  because	  the	  former	  often	  
accuse	  the	  latter	  of	  deliberately	  keeping	  inefficient	  gold	  extraction	  technologies	  at	  the	  mills	  (to	  
maximise	  profits	  for	  the	  owner)	  (Mtetwa	  and	  Shava,	  2003).	  While	  management	  of	  donor-­‐supported	  
milling	  centres	  was	  poor	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  these	  concerns	  are	  frequently	  expressed	  with	  different	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	   Interview,	  Bindura,	  April	  2009	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levels	  of	  blame	  being	  directed	  at	  government	  agents	  and	  international	  donors,	  which	  both	  had	  
short-­‐term	  visions	  and	  interests	  in	  ‘quick-­‐fix’	  solutions	  for	  the	  sector.	  
	  
Notwithstanding	  the	  above	  problems,	  the	  ‘assistance-­‐oriented’	  intentions	  behind	  the	  above	  projects	  
still	  stand	  out	  as	  examples	  of	  the	  hope	  and	  enthusiasm	  behind	  formalisation	  initiatives	  in	  the	  1990s	  
and	  the	  early	  2000s.	  Such	  programmes	  indicate	  that	  the	  Government	  of	  Zimbabwe	  had	  been	  active	  
in	  assisting	  gold	  miners,	  considerably	  more	  active	  than	  many	  other	  African	  governments,	  which	  
generally	  had	  experimented	  neither	  with	  riverbed	  panning	  legalisation	  programmes	  at	  the	  district	  
level	  nor	  with	  donor-­‐supported	  gold-­‐processing	  centres.	  These	  projects	  complemented	  other	  
proactive	  policy	  measures	  to	  develop	  sector	  support	  systems,	  and	  it	  is	  particularly	  noteworthy	  that	  
at	  various	  points	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  the	  Government	  of	  Zimbabwe	  kept	  gold	  prices	  for	  small-­‐scale	  
miners	  at	  favourable	  rates	  to	  minimise	  smuggling,	  which	  created	  incentives	  for	  miner	  legalisation	  
and	  registration;	  in	  fact,	  the	  government	  even	  had	  a	  special	  ‘support	  price’	  for	  gold	  that	  small-­‐scale	  
miners	  sold	  to	  the	  Reserve	  Bank	  in	  the	  1990s,	  which	  was	  at	  certain	  times	  higher	  than	  international	  
market	  prices.	  This	  pricing	  policy	  was	  devised	  both	  to	  encourage	  industry	  growth	  and	  to	  increase	  
government	  gold	  collection	  (Dreschler,	  2001).	  These	  kinds	  of	  proactive	  policies	  gave	  outside	  
agencies	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  Government	  of	  Zimbabwe	  was	  actively	  seeking	  to	  encourage	  informal	  
workers	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  formal	  economy,	  and	  thus,	  they	  gave	  donors	  a	  sense	  of	  confidence	  in	  
becoming	  involved	  in	  the	  small-­‐scale	  mining	  sector.	  
	  
While	  confidence	  among	  donors	  led	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  international	  assistance	  programmes,	  the	  last	  
donor	  project	  –	  before	  an	  eventual	  cessation	  of	  donor	  support	  in	  this	  sector	  –	  came	  to	  fruition	  in	  
2005,	  when	  the	  UN	  Industrial	  Development	  Organization	  (UNIDO)	  worked	  with	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Mines	  
and	  Mining	  Development	  and	  the	  University	  of	  Zimbabwe	  to	  begin	  developing	  a	  ‘Train-­‐the-­‐Trainer’	  
programme	  in	  gold-­‐mining	  communities	  in	  the	  Kadoma-­‐Chakari	  area.	  This	  programme	  (on	  which	  I	  
worked)	  encouraged	  educational	  services	  on	  issues	  ranging	  from	  pollution-­‐reduction	  technologies	  to	  
business	  and	  organisational	  training	  (Spiegel	  and	  Veiga,	  2005).	  This	  United	  N	  effort	  was	  part	  of	  a	  
larger	  global	  initiative	  –	  the	  ‘Global	  Mercury	  Project’	  –	  and	  it	  was	  focused	  on	  reducing	  the	  use	  of	  
mercury	  in	  gold	  extraction,	  as	  mercury	  pollution	  has	  been	  identified	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  severe	  
environmental	  concerns	  in	  Zimbabwe’s	  mining	  sector	  (Gunson	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  	  The	  early	  experiences	  of	  
the	  Global	  Mercury	  Project	  suggested	  that,	  relative	  to	  other	  countries	  (e.g.	  Tanzania,	  Sudan,	  
Indonesia,	  Brazil,	  Lao	  People’s	  Democratic	  Republic),	  Zimbabwe	  had	  some	  of	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  
mercury	  pollution	  and	  human	  exposure	  to	  toxic	  risks	  (Gunson	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  
sociological	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  assessments	  conducted	  by	  UN	  consultants	  (Hinton	  and	  Veiga,	  2004;	  
Mtetwa	  and	  Shava,	  2003)	  showed	  that	  Zimbabwe	  had	  –	  relative	  to	  other	  countries	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  
Africa	  –	  some	  of	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  education,	  literacy	  and	  infrastructure	  in	  the	  mining	  sector,	  
which	  could	  help	  in	  developing	  formalisation	  programmes.	  Zimbabwe	  also	  had	  some	  particularly	  
notable	  experiences	  with	  government	  microfinance	  programmes	  for	  miners	  which,	  although	  
imperfect	  and	  subject	  to	  institutional	  problems	  in	  service	  delivery,	  as	  some	  miners	  emphasised	  in	  my	  
interviews,14	  became	  profiled	  at	  a	  UN	  conference	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  proactive	  examples	  of	  how	  
formalisation	  could	  lead	  to	  benefits	  such	  as	  credit	  access.	  The	  conference,	  which	  was	  hosted	  in	  the	  
town	  of	  Kadoma	  and	  which	  brought	  together	  government	  officials	  and	  UN	  training	  staff	  from	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	   As	  one	  miner	  noted	  in	  an	  interview	  that	  focused	  on	  the	  microfinance	  facilities	  managed	  by	  the	  government,	  ‘A	  few	  of	  
the	  small-­‐scale	  miners	  in	  Zimbabwe	  received	  loans	  [from	  a	  government-­‐managed	  micro-­‐loan	  programme]	  just	  before	  the	  
election.	  It	  was	  actually	  an	  election-­‐motivated	  decision,	  to	  try	  to	  show	  a	  good	  face…	  In	  the	  end	  I	  don’t	  think	  the	  loans	  were	  
used	  for	  mining	  equipment	  like	  they	  were	  supposed	  to	  be.	  Some	  people	  got	  nice	  cars	  with	  those	  loans…	  it	  was	  not	  the	  
people	  who	  needed	  the	  loans’	  (Zimbabwean	  small-­‐scale	  miner,	  interviewed	  April	  2009).	  
14	  
Tanzania,	  Zimbabwe	  and	  Sudan,	  included	  a	  special	  presentation	  from	  an	  official	  from	  the	  
Zimbabwe’s	  Mining	  Industry	  and	  Loan	  Fund	  (MILF).	  MILF	  offered	  a	  variety	  of	  cash	  loans	  for	  
developing	  small-­‐scale	  mines,	  equipment	  loans	  and	  other	  types	  of	  business	  loans	  that	  were	  
specifically	  tailored	  for	  small-­‐scale	  miners.	  Since	  MILF	  was	  housed	  within	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Mines	  and	  
Mining	  Development,	  it	  stood	  out	  as	  a	  rare	  example	  of	  a	  loans	  facility	  that	  could	  integrate	  sector-­‐
specific	  training	  and	  credit	  delivery	  to	  mineworkers.	  
	  
As	  participants	  at	  the	  conference	  generally	  agreed,	  other	  countries	  in	  Africa	  would	  be	  well	  advised	  
to	  explore	  ways	  of	  emulating	  the	  MILF	  model,	  and	  a	  Tanzanian	  government	  representative,	  in	  
particular,	  explained	  that	  this	  would	  be	  a	  good	  model	  to	  copy	  in	  Tanzanian’s	  Ministry	  of	  Minerals	  
and	  Energy.	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  2005,	  there	  was	  some	  degree	  of	  talk	  at	  international	  conferences	  of	  
Zimbabwe	  as	  a	  leader	  in	  Africa’s	  gold-­‐mining	  sector	  –	  a	  leader	  that	  was	  simultaneously	  creating	  
incentives	  and	  rewards	  for	  artisanal	  miners	  to	  become	  formalised	  while	  inspiring	  other	  countries’	  
policy	  development	  in	  the	  region.	  While	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  the	  more	  organised	  and	  wealthier	  small-­‐
scale	  miners	  tended	  to	  benefit	  more	  from	  licensing	  laws,	  even	  the	  unlicensed	  miners	  had	  some	  
degree	  of	  access	  to	  some	  of	  the	  education	  programmes	  that	  the	  government	  had	  developed	  –	  
suggesting	  to	  some	  that	  positive	  interaction	  with	  the	  ‘informal’	  miners	  had	  been	  nurtured.	  
	  
4.3. Recentralising	  power	  and	  formalisation	  policy	  reversals:	  A	  turn	  
towards	  criminalisation	  and	  crackdowns	  (2006–2010)	  
If	  the	  above	  policy	  developments	  present	  cause	  for	  some	  optimism	  in	  Zimbabwe’s	  gold-­‐mining	  
sector,	  the	  situation	  by	  2007	  reflects	  a	  drastically	  different	  scenario.	  As	  inflation	  levels	  began	  to	  
ascend	  dramatically	  in	  2006	  and	  2007,	  problems	  began	  to	  multiply	  for	  miners,	  perhaps	  most	  vividly	  
illustrated	  by	  this	  fact:	  the	  government	  insisted	  that	  gold	  miners	  sell	  their	  gold	  to	  the	  Reserve	  Bank	  
of	  Zimbabwe	  at	  a	  tiny	  fraction	  of	  the	  actual	  international	  gold	  price,	  sometimes	  even	  as	  little	  as	  one	  
thirtieth	  (1/30)	  of	  the	  true	  international	  price	  when	  calculated	  at	  parallel	  market	  rates	  (as	  discussed	  
in	  detail	  below).	  Accusations	  of	  corruption	  within	  the	  MILF	  programme	  also	  intensified.	  
Furthermore,	  riverbed	  panning	  was	  made	  completely	  illegal	  in	  2006,	  when	  the	  Central	  Government	  
repealed	  the	  law	  (Statutory	  Instrument	  275	  of	  1991)	  that	  allowed	  Rural	  District	  Councils	  to	  issue	  
permits	  for	  gold	  panning.15	  In	  fact,	  in	  mid-­‐2006,	  district	  council	  officials	  in	  Insiza	  District	  informed	  me	  
that	  I	  was	  the	  first	  person	  to	  let	  them	  know	  that	  the	  central	  government	  had	  repealed	  this	  law;	  the	  
central	  government	  had	  not	  even	  informed	  the	  district	  government	  of	  this	  legal	  reform	  until	  several	  
weeks	  after	  the	  repealing	  of	  the	  law.	  The	  local	  government	  coordinator	  who	  had	  been	  responsible	  
for	  overseeing	  gold	  panning	  was,	  in	  an	  interview	  in	  2006,	  disappointed	  to	  hear	  of	  this	  legal	  change,	  
even	  wondering	  out	  loud:	  ‘Does	  this	  mean	  that	  my	  job	  is	  finished?...	  Is	  the	  local	  government	  
supposed	  to	  work	  with	  the	  [gold	  panners]	  or	  not?’	  Further	  discussions	  in	  2007	  and	  2009	  with	  
officials	  within	  the	  Insiza	  District	  Council	  would	  again	  confirm	  that	  the	  district	  still	  had	  no	  power	  to	  
manage	  gold-­‐mining,	  despite	  widespread	  desire	  in	  the	  community	  to	  engage	  in	  panning.	  The	  local	  
government	  was	  powerless	  to	  change	  the	  law	  and,	  although	  some	  local	  government	  council	  
members	  spoke	  of	  hopes	  and	  even	  plans	  of	  re-­‐legalising	  riverbed	  panning,	  they	  noted	  that	  ‘the	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	   Repealing	  Statutory	  Instrument	  275	  did	  not	  automatically	  mean	  that	  the	  central	  government	  would	  refrain	  from	  
issuing	  permits	  to	  companies	  that	  might	  want	  to	  engage	  in	  alluvial	  riverbed	  mining.	  Reportedly,	  according	  to	  some	  panners	  
whom	  I	  interviewed,	  Chinese	  and	  Russian	  companies	  have	  been	  allowed	  to	  do	  panning	  in	  some	  parts	  of	  the	  country,	  for	  
instance	  in	  Chimanimani	  area,	  but	  central	  government	  spokespeople	  did	  not	  confirm	  that	  permits	  were	  given	  explicitly	  for	  
panning	  purposes	  in	  those	  areas.	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decisions	  would	  have	  to	  be	  made	  in	  Harare’	  and	  that	  trying	  to	  convince	  Harare	  authorities	  could	  be	  a	  
long	  process	  and	  a	  difficult	  task	  –	  if	  not	  an	  impossible	  one.	  
	  
Soon	  after	  the	  move	  to	  criminalise	  riverbed	  panning	  in	  2006,	  political	  tensions	  intensified	  in	  new,	  
unprecedented	  ways.	  Citing	  a	  multitude	  of	  economic,	  social	  and	  environmental	  rationales,	  the	  
government	  launched	  a	  nationwide	  crackdown	  against	  gold	  panners,	  gold	  miners	  and	  gold	  traders	  at	  
the	  end	  of	  2006,	  during	  the	  week	  before	  Christmas.	  The	  operation	  was	  widely	  seen	  as	  a	  ‘surprise’	  for	  
miners	  as	  well	  as	  for	  local	  government	  officers,	  many	  officers	  within	  the	  central	  government	  and	  
others.	  The	  crackdown,	  within	  its	  first	  few	  months,	  left	  thousands	  of	  people	  jobless.	  Crime	  escalated	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  crackdown	  in	  some	  contexts;	  in	  other	  contexts,	  gold-­‐mining	  was	  simply	  forced	  into	  
being	  a	  night-­‐time	  activity	  to	  evade	  arrest;	  in	  some	  contexts,	  riverbed	  gold	  panners	  turned	  to	  
primary	  ore	  gold-­‐mining	  in	  remote	  forest	  areas	  to	  evade	  police;	  and	  in	  other	  contexts,	  miners	  were	  
imprisoned	  for	  as	  long	  as	  five	  years	  for	  illegal	  possession	  of	  gold.	  
	  
In	  the	  media,	  the	  Zimbabwe’s	  mining	  sector	  governance	  became	  increasingly	  characterised	  as	  part	  
of	  a	  ‘brutal	  regime’	  of	  ‘pillage	  and	  patronage’	  with	  injustices	  abounding	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  mineral	  
resources	  (Sokwanele,	  2007,	  p.	  1).	  The	  title	  of	  the	  crackdown	  was	  ‘Operation	  Chikorokoza	  Chapera’	  
(Stamp	  Out	  Illegal	  Mining)	  and	  involved	  the	  arrest	  of	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  miners.16	  The	  
government’s	  emphasis	  on	  formalising	  gold-­‐mining,	  rather	  than	  being	  a	  process	  for	  empowerment	  
of	  the	  poor	  within	  the	  mining	  sector,	  became	  more	  clearly	  visible	  as	  a	  process	  of	  control	  and	  
coercion.	  Following	  are	  three	  examples	  of	  the	  crackdown’s	  highly	  contentious	  implications.	  
1. Corporate	  mining	  model	  for	  ecological	  modernisation	  as	  a	  barrier	  to	  livelihood	  formalisation:	  
One	  impact	  of	  the	  crackdown	  –	  one	  fiercely	  contested	  by	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Zimbabwe	  Miners	  
Federation	  and	  the	  Zimbabwe	  Panners	  Association	  –	  was	  imposition	  of	  a	  uniform	  Environmental	  
Impact	  Assessment	  (EIA)	  requirement	  that	  all	  miners	  had	  to	  complete	  prior	  to	  resuming	  mining	  
operations.	  The	  uniform	  set	  of	  EIA	  requirements	  meant	  that	  a	  consultancy	  report	  had	  to	  be	  paid	  
for	  to	  meet	  all	  the	  EIA	  stipulations	  (usually	  costing	  at	  least	  4,000	  US	  dollars)	  and	  artisanal	  and	  
small-­‐scale	  miners	  also	  had	  to	  pay	  a	  government	  fee.	  This	  model	  for	  the	  EIA,	  which	  
corresponded	  to	  the	  EIA	  system	  that	  was	  designed	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  by	  the	  Canadian	  
International	  Development	  Agency	  (CIDA)	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  Government	  of	  Zimbabwe	  as	  
part	  of	  a	  mining	  reform	  strategy,	  did	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  different	  kinds	  of	  artisanal	  and	  
small-­‐scale	  gold	  extraction	  practice	  (for	  instance,	  the	  EIA	  model	  did	  not	  even	  address	  the	  issue	  
of	  mercury	  use)	  (Spiegel,	  2009)	  and	  served	  as	  a	  rationale	  that	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Environment	  and	  
Tourism	  –	  as	  well	  as	  police	  squads	  –	  used	  when	  cracking	  down	  on	  mining	  communities.	  
2. Licensing	  specifications	  and	  the	  uneven	  distribution	  of	  winners	  and	  losers:	  A	  second	  major	  
impact	  of	  the	  crackdown	  was	  the	  increased	  concern	  in	  mining	  communities	  about	  the	  
inequalities	  in	  accessing	  licences.	  Some	  artisanal	  miners	  did	  not	  have	  a	  licence	  but	  depended	  on	  
a	  relationship	  of	  trust	  with	  registered	  gold	  millers;	  however,	  many	  of	  these	  relationships	  (e.g.	  in	  
the	  Kadoma-­‐Chakari	  region)	  worsened	  when	  police	  began	  cracking	  down	  and	  demanding	  
payments.	  A	  separate	  but	  related	  issue	  was	  the	  particular	  technical	  specifications	  and	  
bureaucratic	  processes	  associated	  with	  registration	  and	  licensing.	  While	  the	  major	  concern	  
among	  miners	  was	  about	  institutional	  problems	  at	  the	  central	  government	  level,	  many	  miners	  
indicated	  clearly	  that	  they	  would	  like	  to	  become	  ‘legal’	  –	  even	  if	  it	  meant	  paying	  more	  taxes	  to	  
the	  government	  –	  but	  they	  were	  not	  sure	  how.	  In	  some	  cases,	  the	  limitations	  that	  miners	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   In	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  the	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  above	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  August	  2008,	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  government	  announced	  
another	  9,000	  arrests	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  diamond	  and	  gold	  miners.	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identified	  also	  related	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  particular	  spatial	  dimensions	  of	  licensing	  laws	  were	  
technically	  biased	  in	  favour	  of	  larger-­‐scale	  operations.	  As	  one	  small-­‐scale	  miner	  noted	  in	  
Zimbabwe,	  once	  prospecting	  work	  is	  done	  to	  ascertain	  the	  geological	  potential	  in	  an	  area,	  the	  
Mines	  and	  Minerals	  Act	  stipulates	  that	  there	  is	  a	  minimum	  size	  for	  the	  mining	  claim	  when	  miners	  
engage	  in	  pegging	  –	  the	  process	  of	  marking	  the	  boundaries	  for	  a	  licensed	  mining	  claim:	  
The	  minimum	  for	  pegging	  is	  10	  hectares.	  It	  is	  too	  large…	  The	  minimum	  should	  be	  5	  hectares.	  It’s	  
hard	  to	  find	  good	  areas	  that	  aren’t	  pegged	  you	  know…	  There	  are	  some	  [mineral-­‐rich	  regions	  that	  
aren’t	  pegged	  yet]	  but	  it’s	  too	  close	  to	  [environmentally]	  protected	  areas	  or	  off	  limits	  for	  other	  
reasons.	  There	  are	  pegged	  areas	  with	  [larger	  mining	  companies]	  that	  have	  certain	  shapes	  that	  make	  
it	  hard	  to	  work	  around	  them	  [he	  sketches	  a	  map	  for	  me	  to	  see].	  Just	  5	  hectares	  is	  better.	  (Interview,	  
April,	  2009,	  Harare,	  Zimbabwe)	  
3. No	  foreign	  donor	  support	  and	  no	  rural	  governance	  support:	  During	  and	  after	  various	  police	  
crackdowns,	  questions	  arose	  as	  to	  whether	  re-­‐legalising	  panning	  could	  be	  a	  viable	  strategy	  for	  
managing	  risks	  more	  appropriately.	  Although	  donor	  support	  was	  provided	  to	  governance	  agents	  
in	  the	  1990s,	  Rural	  District	  Councils	  found	  during	  2006–2012	  that	  there	  was	  no	  longer	  any	  
support	  –	  either	  from	  the	  central	  government	  or	  from	  donors	  –	  for	  regulating	  and	  managing	  
risks	  associated	  with	  gold	  panning.	  While	  Insiza	  District	  Council	  members	  spoke	  of	  plans	  in	  2009	  
of	  re-­‐legalising	  gold	  panning,	  this	  would	  only	  be	  possible	  if	  central	  government	  authorities	  
approved	  their	  request,	  which	  would	  be	  conditional	  upon	  the	  central	  government	  believing	  that	  
local	  capacities	  were	  in	  place	  to	  legalise	  panning.	  As	  no	  support	  was	  available	  for	  empowering	  
district	  governance	  structures	  (CIDA	  and	  other	  donor	  agencies	  were	  no	  longer	  involved;	  
interviews	  with	  donor	  agencies	  confirmed	  that	  most	  donors	  are	  waiting	  for	  the	  national	  political	  
situation	  to	  change	  dramatically),	  local	  authorities	  remain	  unsupported	  and	  panners	  continue	  to	  
have	  no	  option	  but	  to	  operate	  illegally.	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5. Case	  study:	  Contested	  formalisation	  policy	  
and	  small-­‐scale	  mining	  livelihoods	  in	  
Indonesia	  
	  
5.1. Formalisation	  in	  Indonesia’s	  mining	  sector	  
This	  section	  further	  discusses	  how	  national	  paradigms	  for	  formalising	  economic	  activity	  can	  
misrecognise	  labour	  realities	  in	  small-­‐scale	  mining	  areas.	  It	  focuses	  on	  situating	  the	  politics	  of	  
regulating	  resource	  extraction	  within	  the	  context	  of	  Indonesian	  policy	  reforms	  that	  were	  ostensibly	  
designed	  to	  promote	  ‘governance	  decentralisation’	  and	  ‘local	  rights’,	  followed	  by	  efforts	  to	  
‘recentralise’	  power	  in	  more	  recent	  years.	  Mining	  has	  long	  taken	  in	  place	  in	  Central	  Kalimantan,	  
Indonesia’s	  third	  largest	  province,	  and	  this	  section	  focuses	  on	  a	  specific	  region	  in	  Central	  Kalimantan	  




Figure	  3.	   Location	  of	  Palangkaraya	  in	  Indonesia	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Since	  1997,	  no	  state	  companies	  or	  commercial	  companies	  have	  been	  interested	  in	  mining	  the	  same	  
resources	  that	  small-­‐scale	  miners	  have	  been	  mining	  –	  gold.	  Thus,	  this	  particular	  case	  provides	  a	  
contrast	  to	  many	  of	  the	  gold-­‐mining	  sites	  along	  Zimbabwe’s	  Great	  Dyke,	  where	  companies	  actively	  
compete	  with	  ASM	  workers	  for	  territorial	  control.	  Paradoxically,	  however,	  even	  as	  no	  companies	  
have	  recently	  made	  formal	  claims	  on	  gold	  extraction	  rights	  in	  this	  area,	  mining	  companies’	  
advocacies	  about	  the	  need	  to	  police	  unlicensed	  ASM	  (for	  economic,	  environmental	  and	  social	  
reasons)	  have	  been	  significant	  even	  in	  this	  case,	  as	  conveyers	  of	  influence	  on	  governance	  from	  
beyond	  Galangan’s	  borders.	  Identities	  of	  different	  types	  of	  miners	  in	  Indonesia’s	  gold-­‐mining	  sector	  
have	  been	  shaped	  by	  discourses	  and	  institutional	  processes	  that	  cut	  across	  regional	  and	  global	  scales	  
and	  this,	  in	  turn,	  has	  shaped	  an	  uneven	  mining	  regulation	  regime	  that	  largely	  makes	  the	  
‘formalisation’	  of	  resource	  rights	  beneficial	  to	  more	  economically	  well-­‐off	  constituents	  in	  the	  
industry	  rather	  than	  poorer	  ASM	  workers.	  
	  
Tania	  Li’s	  discussion	  on	  dominant	  law	  enforcement	  discourses	  and	  legalistic	  rights	  discourses	  in	  
Indonesia	  suggests	  that	  law	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  ‘problematic	  basis	  for	  justice’	  (Li,	  2002,	  p.	  278).	  While	  this	  
sentiment	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  powerful	  expression	  of	  inequality	  in	  both	  Zimbabwe	  and	  Indonesia,	  the	  
section	  below	  highlights	  several	  differences	  from	  contexts	  in	  Zimbabwe	  while	  also	  showing	  
similarities.	  Among	  other	  differences,	  in	  the	  region	  I	  studied	  in	  Indonesia,	  no	  registered	  small-­‐scale	  
mining	  associations	  had	  existed	  in	  recent	  years,	  whereas	  in	  Zimbabwe,	  as	  we	  saw,	  formally	  
registered	  small-­‐scale	  gold-­‐mining	  federations	  existed	  and	  had	  lobbied	  for	  their	  interests	  and	  rights	  
with	  some	  impressive	  degree	  of	  organisation;	  thus,	  prospects	  for	  ‘decriminalising’	  gold	  miners	  and	  
regional	  social	  mobilisation	  dynamics	  necessarily	  have	  to	  be	  conceptualised	  in	  different	  forms.	  As	  in	  
Zimbabwe,	  Indonesia’s	  small-­‐scale	  miners	  have	  been	  heavily	  criticised	  on	  environmental	  grounds,	  at	  
times	  to	  the	  point	  that	  entire	  bans	  on	  certain	  kinds	  of	  small-­‐scale	  mining	  have	  been	  adopted.	  
	  
Past	  studies	  in	  Indonesia	  have	  called	  attention	  to	  the	  inequalities	  in	  central	  state	  dominance	  in	  
formalisation.	  Analysing	  the	  geographical	  combination	  of	  factors	  in	  this	  respect	  calls	  into	  question	  
Central	  Kalimantan’s	  uniquely	  prominent	  place	  in	  global	  movements	  to	  enforce	  environmental	  
protection	  law	  and	  associated	  efforts	  to	  use	  what	  Elmhirst	  (1999,	  p.	  831)	  calls	  the	  ‘conceptualized	  
space	  of	  the	  state’	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  spatial	  control.	  This	  discussion	  of	  state	  roles	  in	  Central	  Kalimantan	  
thus	  draws	  on	  debates	  about	  the	  limits	  of	  past	  environmental	  governance	  regimes	  in	  the	  region.	  
While	  McCarthy	  (2004)	  examined	  how	  ‘decentralisation’	  policies	  contributed	  to	  ‘the	  emergence	  of	  
volatile	  socio-­‐legal	  configurations	  in	  Central	  Kalimantan’	  (p.	  1199),	  focusing	  on	  the	  governance	  of	  
illegal	  logging	  and	  community	  forestry	  practices,	  little	  research	  has	  addressed	  how	  contested	  socio-­‐
legal	  configurations	  impact	  small-­‐scale	  miners’	  livelihood	  challenges	  in	  Central	  Kalimantan.	  I	  
consider	  the	  relative	  significance	  of	  different	  regulatory	  pressures	  on	  these	  challenges	  and	  their	  
environmental,	  economic	  and	  socio-­‐political	  dimensions,	  suggesting	  that	  ASM	  in	  Central	  Kalimantan	  
should	  be	  understood	  in	  relation	  to	  what	  Elmhirst	  (2001)	  calls	  a	  contested	  control	  dynamic	  whereby	  
elites	  ‘capitalize’	  on	  ‘uncertainty’	  while	  ‘livelihood	  vulnerability…has	  been	  intensified	  through	  the	  
reassertion	  of	  place-­‐based	  cultures	  of	  resource	  control’	  (p.	  284).	  Ultimately,	  the	  section	  argues	  that	  
the	  non-­‐recognition	  of	  poorer	  groups’	  resource	  rights	  in	  contested	  space	  can	  be	  conceptualised	  as	  a	  
dynamic	  problem,	  one	  that	  has	  been	  shaped	  by	  changing	  ‘recentralisation’	  power	  dynamics	  in	  
planning	  and	  governance,	  with	  evolving	  implications	  for	  controlling	  resources	  and	  restricting	  
livelihood	  possibilities.	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5.2. Contextualising	  mineral	  regulation	  debates	  in	  Indonesia	  
5.2.1.	   Mining	  in	  Indonesia	  and	  people-­‐centred	  approaches	  in	  the	  literature	  
Past	  research	  in	  Indonesia	  has	  highlighted	  a	  heterogeneous	  array	  of	  advocacies	  explaining	  why	  
government	  authorities	  should	  do	  more	  to	  ensure	  that	  ‘indigenous	  people’	  benefit	  from	  mineral	  
wealth	  and	  in	  more	  sustainable	  ways	  (Burke	  2006;	  Erman,	  2007;	  Yasmi	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  Yet,	  despite	  
frequent	  agreement	  on	  the	  vague	  assertion	  that	  indigenous	  populations	  should	  benefit	  from	  mineral	  
resources,	  the	  idea	  that	  indigenous	  workers	  should	  be	  empowered	  more	  as	  active	  participants	  who	  
labour	  within	  the	  mining	  sector	  has	  received	  conspicuously	  mixed	  levels	  of	  support	  (Downing	  et	  al.,	  
2002;	  O’Faircheallaigh	  and	  Ali,	  2008).	  This	  discrepancy	  has	  arisen	  particularly	  as	  environmental	  and	  
social	  problems	  associated	  with	  unlicensed	  ASM	  activities	  have	  remained	  locked	  in	  uneasy	  debates.	  
Such	  activities,	  typically	  undertaken	  by	  Indonesian	  workers	  (villagers	  and	  migrants)	  and	  referred	  to	  
as	  ‘illegal	  mining’,	  have	  expanded	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  in	  numerous	  regions	  of	  Indonesia	  (Aspinall,	  
2001;	  Etemad	  and	  Salmasi,	  2003;	  Sulaiman	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Many	  arguments	  have	  been	  put	  forward	  to	  
police	  ‘illegal	  miners’	  more	  severely,	  as	  advocated	  by	  large	  mining	  companies,	  which	  criticise	  how	  
small-­‐scale	  miners	  cause	  problems	  by	  operating	  on	  company-­‐owned	  lands;	  companies	  widely	  argue	  
that	  this	  deters	  foreign	  investment	  (Bhasin	  and	  Venkataramany,	  2007;	  PricewaterhouseCoopers,	  
2006).	  Scientific	  literature	  has	  often	  directly	  and	  indirectly	  bolstered	  this	  corporate	  advocacy	  
through	  industrial	  and	  ecological	  modernisation	  discourses;	  extensive	  literature,	  for	  instance,	  has	  
emphasised	  problems	  with	  rudimentary	  gold-­‐mining	  such	  as	  pollution	  and	  land	  degradation	  and	  
suggested	  that	  risks	  occur	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  regulatory	  enforcement	  by	  Indonesia’s	  government	  
(Kambey	  et	  al.,	  2001;	  Edinger	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  McMahon	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  
	  
Despite	  the	  common	  advocacy	  to	  enforce	  existing	  laws	  immediately,	  a	  more	  recently	  emergent	  body	  
of	  research	  has	  suggested	  that	  Indonesia’s	  ‘informal’	  –	  unlicensed	  –	  mining	  sector	  can	  provide	  
crucial	  income-­‐earning	  opportunities	  to	  rural	  workers	  and	  that	  governance	  approaches	  and	  property	  
rights	  regimes	  must	  be	  revised	  to	  be	  more	  sensitive	  to	  communities	  that	  depend	  on	  informal	  ASM	  as	  
a	  poverty-­‐alleviation	  activity	  (Aspinall,	  2001;	  Yasmi	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  Some	  recent	  studies	  in	  the	  region	  
have	  also	  suggested	  that	  environmental	  protection	  models	  particularly	  have	  suffered	  due	  to	  their	  
inattentiveness	  to	  the	  concerns	  of	  vulnerable	  mining	  communities	  in	  the	  informal	  sector	  (Burke,	  
2006;	  Erman,	  2007;	  Sulaiman	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Influenced	  by	  a	  growing	  literature	  on	  community-­‐based	  
natural	  resource	  management	  (CBNRM),	  largely	  in	  the	  forestry	  sector,	  debates	  about	  governance,	  
poverty	  and	  environmental	  sustainability	  in	  Asia	  have	  increasingly	  emphasised	  a	  rights-­‐based	  
approach,	  in	  which	  equitable	  development	  is	  strongly	  associated	  with	  individual	  and	  community	  
rights	  (Nomura,	  2008).	  While	  local	  miners’	  livelihood	  aspirations	  have	  not	  featured	  prominently	  in	  
Indonesia’s	  rights-­‐based	  or	  CBNRM	  literature	  to	  date,	  understanding	  the	  contemporary	  governance	  
of	  resources	  requires	  moving	  beyond	  the	  discussion	  of	  impacts	  from	  resource	  extraction	  and	  
governance	  challenges	  in	  theory.	  It	  also	  requires	  a	  close	  contextual	  understanding	  of	  institutions	  
that	  address	  mineral	  extraction	  and	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  they	  respond	  to	  competing	  priorities	  and	  
views	  on	  labour	  and	  rights.	  In	  the	  sections	  below	  I	  contextualise	  these	  concerns	  by	  looking	  at	  
historical	  influences	  on	  the	  development	  of	  mineral	  governance	  regimes	  first	  in	  the	  pre-­‐
decentralisation	  era,	  then	  in	  the	  decentralisation	  era,	  and	  then	  in	  what	  I	  call	  the	  ‘post-­‐
decentralisation	  era’.	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5.2.2.	   Influences	  in	  the	  development	  of	  mineral	  governance	  institutions	  
While	  colonial-­‐era	  governance	  regimes	  created	  highly	  centralised	  systems	  for	  licensing	  minerals	  and	  
allowed	  only	  elites	  to	  participate	  in	  mining	  development,	  the	  development	  of	  the	  mining	  sector	  was	  
far	  more	  vigorously	  pursued	  in	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  era.17	  In	  1958,	  the	  Government	  of	  Indonesia	  passed	  
Foreign	  Investment	  Law	  No.	  78,	  which	  sought	  to	  boost	  investment,	  but,	  given	  the	  an	  unstable	  
political	  and	  economic	  climate,	  the	  law	  did	  little	  to	  attract	  major	  international	  mining	  investors	  at	  
the	  time	  (Etemad	  and	  Salmasi,	  2003).	  Following	  the	  abortive	  coup	  attempt	  of	  1965,18	  the	  New	  Order	  
Government	  under	  President	  Suharto	  carried	  out	  sweeping	  reforms	  in	  the	  resources	  sector,	  creating	  
new	  regimes	  for	  mineral	  exploitation.	  In	  1966,	  the	  Temporary	  People’s	  Consultative	  Assembly	  
passed	  Decree	  No.	  XXIII,	  reforming	  economic	  policies	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  reviving	  the	  resources	  
industry	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  crisis.	  The	  decree	  provided	  that	  natural	  resources	  within	  Indonesia	  shall	  
be	  exploited	  so	  they	  can	  be	  turned	  into	  ‘national	  economic	  development’	  and	  stressed	  that	  
investment	  capital	  and	  expertise	  from	  abroad	  must	  be	  sought.	  Based	  on	  the	  decree,	  two	  laws	  were	  
introduced	  to	  replace	  Law	  No.	  78	  of	  1958	  and	  Law	  No.	  37	  of	  1960:	  Foreign	  Investment	  Law	  No.	  1	  of	  
1967	  and	  Mining	  Law	  No.	  11	  of	  1967.	  
	  
The	  above	  laws	  have	  come	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  decisive	  influences	  in	  Indonesia’s	  economic	  
development	  history,	  particularly	  as	  foreign	  developers	  were	  strongly	  encouraged	  to	  participate	  in	  
the	  mineral	  sector	  and	  granted	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  country’s	  mineral	  rights.	  The	  heavy	  prioritisation	  
on	  foreign	  investment	  in	  Indonesia	  –	  which	  is	  among	  the	  world’s	  top	  10	  producers	  of	  gold,	  copper,	  
nickel	  and	  tin	  –	  was	  continued	  and	  even	  more	  vigorously	  championed	  through	  World	  Bank-­‐
promoted	  structural	  adjustment	  reforms	  pursued	  during	  the	  financial	  crisis	  in	  the	  1990s	  
(Tsing,	  2005;	  Watkins	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  As	  officials	  lamented	  the	  low-­‐level	  capacity	  of	  the	  state,	  Article	  10	  
of	  the	  Mining	  Law	  stipulated	  that	  development	  of	  strategic	  and	  vital	  minerals	  could	  be	  undertaken	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	   Initiated	  by	  Indians	  and	  Chinese	  in	  Sumatra	  and	  Kalimantan,	  mineral	  exploitation	  was	  expanded	  during	  the	  Dutch	  
colonial	  period	  from	  1695	  to	  1942,	  and	  historical	  records	  suggest	  that	  many	  of	  the	  mineral	  developments	  conducted	  
nowadays	  are	  continuations	  of	  mines	  established	  during	  the	  Dutch	  colonial	  period.	  The	  influence	  of	  the	  Dutch	  
administrative	  system	  can	  also	  be	  found	  in	  aspects	  of	  mining	  laws	  as	  they	  are	  applied	  today;	  in	  particular,	  the	  aspects	  of	  
mineral	  law	  that	  authorise	  the	  central	  government	  to	  issue	  mineral	  permits	  for	  gold	  and	  that	  grant	  the	  provincial	  
government	  the	  right	  to	  issue	  limestone	  and	  clay	  development	  permits	  provide	  some	  of	  the	  clearest	  proof	  of	  this	  
influence.	  As	  technocratic	  scientific	  literature	  often	  oversimplifies	  or	  omits	  the	  discussion	  of	  historical	  influences	  on	  
contemporary	  policy	  institutions	  and	  of	  global	  political	  pressures	  that	  shape	  domestic	  resource	  management	  frameworks,	  
it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  no	  study	  of	  Indonesian	  mining	  policy	  should	  proceed	  without	  recognising	  past	  influences	  on	  
mineral	  laws	  beginning	  with	  colonisation	  and	  how	  these	  have	  evolved	  through	  transitioning	  patterns	  of	  international	  
influence	  (Watkins	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Bridge,	  2004;	  Ballard	  and	  Banks,	  2003;	  Tsing,	  2005).	  Historical	  records	  indicate	  that	  it	  was	  
not	  until	  1899	  that	  a	  mining	  statute	  was	  established	  as	  Indonesia’s	  legal	  foundation	  for	  mining	  exploration	  and	  
exploitation.	  The	  basic	  mining	  laws	  then	  were	  the	  1899	  Indische	  Mijnwet,	  which	  was	  modified	  in	  1910	  and	  1918,	  and	  the	  
Mijnnordonantie	  (Mining	  Ordinance)	  of	  1906.	  These	  laws	  provided	  the	  central	  government	  with	  rights	  to	  administer	  all	  
mining	  licences	  for	  oil,	  metal,	  coal,	  diamonds	  and	  other	  main	  materials.	  Materials	  which	  were	  considered	  ‘less	  important’	  –	  
for	  example,	  limestone,	  sand	  and	  clay	  –	  were	  given	  to	  district	  authorities	  for	  administration.	  Special	  mining	  contracts	  were	  
introduced	  to	  facilitate	  large-­‐scale	  projects;	  this	  form	  of	  contract	  was	  commonly	  known	  as	  a	  ‘5a	  contract’:	  a	  provision	  
added	  into	  the	  Indische	  Mijnwet	  of	  1907.	  Among	  the	  important	  features	  of	  the	  ‘5a	  contract’	  were:	  (i)	  national	  government	  
held	  the	  rights	  to	  conduct	  exploration	  and	  mineral	  development;	  and	  (ii)	  government	  agents	  could	  create	  contracts	  or	  
agreements	  with	  a	  third	  party	  in	  performing	  exploration	  and	  mining	  activities,	  so	  long	  as	  the	  contract	  was	  not	  in	  conflict	  
with	  existing	  regulations.	  
18	   An	  attempted	  coup	  late	  on	  30	  September	  1965	  led	  to	  a	  military	  takeover	  in	  Indonesia	  by	  General	  Suharto,	  who	  
replaced	  President	  Sukarno	  as	  ruler	  of	  Indonesia.	  In	  1968,	  Sukarno	  was	  stripped	  of	  his	  title	  of	  President	  for	  Life.	  He	  
remained	  under	  house	  arrest	  until	  his	  death.	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by	  private	  developers	  appointed	  by	  the	  Minister	  of	  Mines	  and	  Energy.	  This	  appointment	  was	  
facilitated	  under	  a	  contractual	  agreement,	  later	  named	  a	  Contract	  of	  Work	  for	  minerals	  (CoW),	  Coal	  
Contract	  for	  coal	  (CC)	  and	  Production	  Sharing	  Contract	  for	  Petroleum	  (PSC)	  (Etemad	  and	  Salmasi,	  
2003).	  Significantly,	  however,	  for	  economic	  and	  practical	  reasons,	  the	  Minister	  was	  also	  empowered	  
to	  designate	  certain	  limited	  deposits	  of	  strategic	  minerals	  for	  exploitation	  and	  authorise	  the	  
development	  of	  other	  minerals	  by	  provincial	  governments,	  under	  a	  ‘Mining	  Authorisation’	  scheme	  
or	  Kuasa	  Pertambangan	  (KP)	  (Article	  12,	  Law	  11,	  1967).	  The	  KP	  was	  a	  licence	  type	  that	  allowed	  only	  
the	  participation	  of	  Indonesian	  individuals	  or	  wholly	  owned	  Indonesian	  companies;	  domestic	  
investors	  were	  also	  accommodated	  through	  provisions	  known	  as	  ‘People’s	  Mining’	  permits	  (Aspinall,	  
2001).19	  Hence,	  the	  ‘indigenous	  mining	  sector’	  became	  recognised	  –	  on	  paper	  –	  as	  a	  distinct,	  
legitimate	  basis	  for	  community	  development	  insofar	  as	  the	  new	  code	  established	  the	  principle	  that	  
local	  people	  could	  register	  to	  participate	  directly	  in	  mineral	  extraction	  activities.	  
	  
Decades	  of	  debate	  over	  how	  to	  update	  the	  Mining	  Law	  have	  seen	  many	  arguments	  surface,	  primarily	  
through	  pressures	  exerted	  by	  foreign	  mining	  companies20	  and	  NGOs.21	  One	  of	  the	  less	  commonly	  
publicised	  arguments	  for	  reform	  is	  that	  ‘indigenous	  people	  are	  not	  recognised	  constitutionally	  as	  
having	  any	  legal	  rights	  to	  mineral	  deposits’	  (Watkins	  et	  al.,	  2006,	  p.	  5,	  my	  emphasis),	  which	  weakens	  
the	  relevance	  of	  the	  KP	  policies	  for	  small-­‐scale	  mining.22	  Despite	  diverse	  arguments	  about	  updating	  
the	  mineral	  code,	  however,	  Law	  No.	  11	  of	  1967	  provided	  the	  core	  legal	  and	  technical	  framework	  for	  
mineral	  development	  for	  over	  four	  decades.	  The	  1967	  law	  classified	  minerals	  into	  three	  groups:	  
Group	  A	  –	  ‘Strategic	  Minerals’	  (including	  oil,	  coal	  and	  tin,	  among	  others);	  Group	  B	  –	  ‘Vital	  Minerals’	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	   Article	  11	  suggests	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  ‘People’s	  Mining’	  is	  to	  provide	  regional	  governments	  and	  local	  communities	  
with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  exploit	  minerals	  for	  the	  greatest	  benefit	  of	  the	  state	  based	  on	  guidance	  from	  the	  central	  
government.	  Under	  the	  Mining	  Law,	  KPs	  can	  only	  be	  granted	  to	  Indonesian	  individuals	  and	  legal	  entities.	  Watkins	  et	  al.	  
(2006)	  note,	  however,	  that	  ‘although	  the	  Mining	  Law	  contemplates	  that	  the	  KP	  holder	  has	  a	  demonstrable	  capacity	  to	  
exploit	  minerals	  in	  its	  KP	  area,	  this	  is	  often	  not	  the	  case.	  As	  a	  result,	  KP	  holders	  on	  occasion	  enter	  into	  agreements	  with	  
foreign	  mining	  companies	  to	  carry	  out	  mining	  activities	  on	  their	  behalf.’	  Some	  KPs	  contain	  conditions	  requiring	  approval	  of	  
such	  agreements	  (sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘cooperation	  agreements’)	  by	  the	  issuing	  authority.	  Government	  Regulation	  
No.	  75	  of	  2001	  authorises	  Kabupaten	  [regencies]	  to	  issue	  KP	  permits,	  and	  a	  KP	  can	  be	  terminated	  based	  on	  three	  grounds:	  
(i)	  expiration	  of	  its	  term,	  (ii)	  cancellation	  due	  to	  failure	  to	  comply	  with	  government	  regulations	  and	  requirements	  and	  
(iii)	  uneconomic	  reasons.	  After	  completion	  of	  the	  mining	  for	  minerals	  in	  a	  certain	  mine,	  the	  holder	  of	  the	  relevant	  mining	  
authorisation	  is	  obliged	  to	  restore	  the	  land	  to	  such	  a	  condition	  so	  as	  not	  to	  create	  any	  danger	  of	  disease	  or	  any	  other	  
danger	  to	  the	  people	  living	  in	  the	  environment	  of	  the	  mine.	  The	  law	  also	  provides	  penalties	  for	  people	  who	  illegally	  
conduct	  mining	  operations.	  
20	   Mining	  companies	  often	  stress	  that	  the	  Indonesian	  government	  has	  created	  uncertainty	  for	  investment	  by	  threatening	  
to	  impose	  higher	  royalty	  rates.	  However,	  it	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  foreign	  mining	  investments	  rose	  considerably	  in	  the	  
years	  leading	  to	  2008.	  Mining	  investment	  rose	  to	  US$1.6	  billion	  in	  2008,	  up	  from	  US$1.2	  billion	  in	  2007.	  More	  importantly,	  
with	  increases	  in	  mineral	  prices,	  profit	  margins	  rose	  at	  a	  much	  faster	  rate	  than	  investment	  between	  2003	  and	  2007	  
(PricewaterhouseCoopers,	  2007).	  
21	   Ballard	  and	  Banks	  (2003)	  provide	  a	  lengthier	  discussion	  of	  the	  discourses	  of	  NGOs	  that	  advocate	  fairer	  corporate	  
governance	  in	  mining,	  such	  as	  JATAM	  in	  Indonesia	  and	  MiningWatch	  in	  Canada.	  
22	   There	  is	  a	  difference,	  as	  some	  interviewees	  from	  Jakarta	  NGOs	  told	  me,	  between	  policies	  to	  promote	  KPs	  and	  
constitutional	  provisions	  for	  People’s	  Mining.	  Constitutional	  provisions,	  they	  argue,	  would	  give	  more	  weight	  to	  policies	  and	  
regulatory	  measures,	  even	  if	  there	  were	  no	  new	  substantive	  changes	  to	  the	  governance	  approach.	  However,	  as	  there	  is	  no	  
such	  constitutional	  protection	  for	  people’s	  mining,	  and	  as	  the	  Constitution	  of	  Indonesia	  still	  vests	  mineral	  ownership	  at	  the	  
central	  government	  level,	  with	  mineral	  wealth	  to	  ‘be	  controlled	  and	  utilised	  by	  the	  State	  for	  maximum	  prosperity	  of	  the	  
people’	  (see	  discussion	  of	  constitutional	  provisions	  by	  Gandataruna	  and	  Haymon,	  2011),	  the	  national	  state	  holds	  the	  
ultimate	  power	  in	  decision-­‐making	  about	  mineral	  ownership	  and	  mining,	  and	  any	  discussion	  on	  the	  benefits	  of	  
constitutional	  reforms	  would	  be	  hypothetical	  at	  this	  time.	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(including	  iron,	  copper,	  lead,	  gold	  and	  silver);	  and	  Group	  C	  –	  minerals	  not	  included	  in	  either	  Group	  A	  
or	  B	  (including	  limestone,	  sand	  and	  gravel).	  This	  classification	  was	  altered	  slightly	  by	  Government	  
Regulation	  (PP)	  No.	  27	  of	  1980,	  which	  stipulates	  that	  development	  of	  strategic	  and	  vital	  minerals	  is	  
controlled	  by	  the	  state	  while	  provincial	  governments	  are	  in	  charge	  of	  managing	  Group	  C	  minerals.	  
Particularly	  for	  vital	  and	  strategic	  minerals,	  authority	  was	  vested	  in	  the	  Minister	  of	  Mines	  and	  
Energy,	  who	  may	  assign	  foreign	  contractors	  to	  conduct	  developments	  under	  CoW	  agreements	  
(Etemad	  and	  Salmasi,	  2003).	  However,	  following	  the	  Autonomy	  Legislation	  passed	  in	  1999,	  dramatic	  
hopes	  for	  the	  democratisation	  and	  strengthening	  of	  local	  district-­‐level	  environmental	  governance	  
began	  to	  permeate	  the	  country	  –	  with	  various	  new	  implications	  for	  different	  sectors	  (Casson	  and	  
Obidzinski,	  2002;	  McCarthy,	  2004;	  Palmer	  and	  Engel,	  2007).	  Decentralisation	  was	  widely	  viewed	  as	  
an	  attempt	  to	  ‘bring	  government	  programs	  closer	  to	  the	  local	  level,	  where	  presumably	  they	  are	  to	  
be	  tailored	  according	  to	  local	  needs	  and	  conditions’	  (Li,	  2002,	  p.	  275)	  and	  this	  shift	  started	  to	  affect	  
the	  mining	  sector	  in	  new	  ways.	  A	  key	  change	  emerged	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Government	  Regulation	  No.	  75	  
of	  2000,	  which	  authorised	  the	  regional	  government	  –	  at	  the	  regency	  level	  (Kabupaten)	  –	  to	  issue	  ‘KP’	  
(local	  indigenous	  permits)	  for	  all	  minerals	  (Group	  A	  included).	  These	  developments,	  as	  examined	  
below,	  shaped	  contemporary	  challenges,	  setting	  the	  stage	  for	  major	  ongoing	  disagreements	  over	  
mining	  and	  the	  role	  of	  decentralisation	  as	  a	  coherent,	  pro-­‐poor	  and	  pro-­‐environment	  development	  
strategy.	  
	  
5.3. Governing	  minerals	  in	  the	  ‘decentralisation’	  era:	  Rescaling	  governance,	  
rights	  and	  controversy	  
Despite	  the	  Autonomy	  Legislation	  of	  1999	  and	  widespread	  support	  for	  decentralisation	  policies	  in	  
the	  early	  2000s,	  various	  government	  institutions	  disagreed	  in	  the	  years	  thereafter	  when	  discussing	  
whether	  national	  or	  local	  authorities	  can	  administer	  mining	  rights	  in	  particular	  regions	  and	  with	  
regard	  to	  issuing	  permits	  for	  particular	  minerals.	  As	  Forbes	  noted,	  this	  institutional	  tug-­‐of-­‐war	  over	  
resources	  created	  problems	  as	  the	  mining	  industry	  in	  Indonesia	  has	  been	  ‘burdened	  by	  overlapping	  
claims’	  with	  ‘overlaps	  of	  power	  between	  the	  central,	  regional	  and	  local	  governments’	  (Forbes,	  2007,	  
p.	  1).	  Local	  government	  officers	  whom	  I	  interviewed	  argued	  that	  KP	  licences	  for	  minerals	  could	  be	  
issued	  independently	  by	  Kabupaten	  without	  approval	  from	  the	  central	  government;	  this	  was	  often	  
disputed	  by	  the	  central	  government	  agents	  whom	  I	  interviewed,	  who	  suggested	  that	  local	  
governments	  were	  prone	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  responsible	  control	  while	  letting	  mining	  licences	  overlap.	  Some	  
central	  government	  officers	  suggested	  that	  local	  authorities	  failed	  to	  protect	  the	  property	  of	  
companies	  from	  people	  who	  ‘invaded’	  the	  land	  –	  an	  issue	  that	  the	  national	  government	  had	  
previously	  addressed	  through	  the	  use	  of	  police	  squads,	  as	  examined	  further	  below.	  Various	  
stakeholders	  suggested	  that	  unless	  decentralisation	  processes	  are	  clarified,	  national	  authorities	  will	  
never	  truly	  relinquish	  power	  over	  mining	  to	  lower	  levels	  of	  government.	  These	  concerns	  extend	  
earlier	  warnings	  by	  researchers	  who	  cautioned	  that	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  Autonomy	  Laws	  was	  being	  
selectively	  resisted	  in	  the	  mining	  sector;	  Thorburn	  (2002)	  articulated	  this	  sentiment:	  ‘while	  many	  
decisions	  that	  directly	  affect	  local	  people’s	  access	  to	  and	  use	  of	  local	  forest,	  land,	  coastal	  and	  marine	  
resources	  have	  been	  delegated	  to	  the	  districts,	  the	  Ministries	  of	  Forestry	  and	  Mining	  have	  managed	  
to	  retain	  a	  greater	  measure	  of	  centralised	  control	  over	  their	  respective	  realms	  than	  most	  other	  
ministries’	  (p.	  621).	  Sumule	  (2002)	  nonetheless	  drew	  a	  cautiously	  optimistic	  outlook	  on	  early	  
opportunities	  of	  decentralisation	  under	  the	  Autonomy	  Laws	  and	  empowerment	  of	  indigenous	  
people	  in	  the	  mining	  sector,	  exploring	  evolving	  possibilities	  through	  judicial	  and	  customary	  
institutions.	  Contextual	  knowledge	  in	  Indonesia’s	  mining	  sector,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  has	  led	  to	  the	  
concern	  that	  foreign	  companies	  own	  such	  large	  proportions	  of	  mineral	  rights	  in	  key	  geologically	  rich	  
areas	  that	  local	  governments	  are	  prevented	  from	  being	  able	  to	  consider	  the	  possibility	  of	  giving	  
	  23	  
greater	  attention	  to	  indigenous	  land	  claims	  or	  redistributing	  resource	  ownership	  
(Wulandari,	  2008).23	  
	  
Studies	  of	  bribery	  and	  cronyism	  in	  the	  post-­‐decentralisation	  era	  have	  also	  illustrated	  how	  local	  
governments	  have	  failed	  to	  do	  their	  part	  responsibly	  in	  managing	  mineral	  resources	  (Smith	  et	  al.,	  
2003).	  Tsing	  (2005)	  noted	  that	  ‘the	  decentralization	  of	  natural	  resource	  permits	  in	  2000	  spread	  the	  
possibilities	  for	  corruption’	  linking	  political	  confusion	  with	  a	  widespread	  concern	  about	  illegality	  in	  
Central	  Kalimantan,	  decrying	  that	  ‘illegal	  resource	  extraction	  rocketed	  out	  of	  control’	  (p.	  17).	  Her	  
work	  emphasised	  how	  the	  illegality	  of	  mining	  labour	  serves	  multiple	  exploitative	  purposes	  for	  large	  
corporations	  too,	  as	  illegal	  mineral-­‐seekers	  ‘lead	  company	  prospectors	  to	  the	  best	  spots’	  and	  then,	  
later	  on,	  ‘the	  companies	  displace	  them…and	  complain	  about	  the	  illegals,	  blaming	  them	  for	  
environmental	  problems,	  thus	  protecting	  their	  own	  reputation’	  (p.	  67).	  Manus	  (2005)	  added	  to	  such	  
concerns	  by	  lamenting	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘indigenous	  mining	  rights’	  remained	  an	  illusion,	  flatly	  
declaring	  that	  ‘indigenous	  mining	  rights	  are	  not	  recognized	  by	  the	  Indonesian	  authorities	  who	  favour	  
large-­‐scale	  commercial	  exploitation	  over	  small-­‐scale	  mining’	  (p.	  2).	  
	  
Interpretations	  of	  macroeconomic	  and	  political	  debate	  about	  foreign	  investment	  provide	  key	  
overarching	  lenses	  through	  which	  to	  view	  the	  contentious	  governance	  pressures	  in	  Indonesia’s	  
mining	  sector.	  In	  particular,	  the	  heavily	  publicised	  ‘Bre-­‐X	  scandal’	  cast	  an	  ominous	  public	  relations	  
cloud	  over	  the	  multinational	  mining	  industry	  in	  Indonesia.	  Critical	  development	  scholars	  have	  widely	  
recognised	  that,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bre-­‐X,	  a	  Canadian-­‐based	  multinational	  company,	  company	  officials	  
deliberately	  misled	  global	  investors	  about	  business	  prospects	  and	  local	  resource	  viability	  in	  
Kalimantan.	  The	  ensuing	  scandal	  involved	  a	  web	  of	  corruption	  that	  shook	  confidence	  in	  the	  mining	  
industry	  from	  Indonesia	  to	  Canada	  and	  countries	  far	  beyond;	  the	  shock	  waves	  served,	  intellectually	  
speaking,	  as	  an	  occasion	  for	  redefining	  the	  ‘economy	  of	  appearances’	  in	  a	  far-­‐reaching	  global	  mining	  
culture	  that	  allowed	  wealth	  accumulation	  to	  intensify	  based	  merely	  on	  the	  ‘illusion	  of	  success’	  
(Tsing,	  2005).	  Recent	  pollution-­‐	  and	  corruption-­‐related	  scandals	  surrounding	  Newmont	  and	  other	  
companies	  in	  Indonesia	  have	  become	  high	  profile	  as	  well	  (Shaw	  and	  Welford,	  2007),	  and	  the	  
Government	  of	  Indonesia	  has	  been	  under	  pressure	  to	  improve	  the	  international	  image	  of	  the	  mining	  
industry.	  ‘Repairing	  the	  image’	  of	  the	  industry,	  however,	  has	  been	  pursued	  with	  controversial	  
approaches,	  producing	  particularly	  questionable	  benefits	  for	  marginalised	  groups	  in	  rural	  areas.	  The	  
national	  government’s	  use	  of	  police	  has	  repeatedly	  been	  represented	  as	  a	  show	  of	  support	  for	  
foreign	  companies	  in	  order	  to	  entice	  investment;	  indeed	  the	  Indonesian	  Embassy	  Office	  in	  Canada	  
was	  unambiguously	  advertising	  its	  fervent	  support	  for	  Canadian	  commercial	  interests	  when	  its	  
website	  declared	  that	  it	  was	  policing	  local	  illegal	  miners	  to	  protect	  company	  lands,	  with	  a	  headline	  
that	  ran	  ‘Police	  Prioritize	  Eradication	  of	  Illegal	  Mining’	  (Embassy	  of	  Indonesia,	  2007).	  Numerous	  
instances	  of	  police	  and	  military	  crackdowns	  against	  indigenous	  communities	  have	  been	  
documented,	  displacing	  dozens,	  hundreds	  and	  even	  thousands	  of	  people	  at	  a	  time	  and	  involving	  
human	  rights	  violations	  that	  have	  been	  vigorously	  protested	  (Downing,	  2002;	  Downing	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  
Soares,	  2004).	  
	   	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	   In	  terms	  of	  land	  use	  area,	  mining	  occupies	  the	  largest	  land	  area	  of	  any	  industry	  in	  Indonesia.	  Data	  from	  JATAM	  (the	  
Indonesian	  Mining	  Advocacy	  Network)	  shows	  that	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2001,	  the	  government	  had	  issued	  3,246	  mining	  permits,	  
consisting	  of	  893	  mining	  permits	  covering	  32,765,833	  hectares,	  105	  contracts	  of	  work	  covering	  25,715,557	  hectares,	  110	  
coal	  contracts	  covering	  8,410,106	  hectares	  and	  2,138	  local	  mining	  permits	  issued	  by	  local	  governments.	  For	  more	  detail,	  
see:	  http://www.foei.org/en/publications/link/101/e1011415.html	  (accessed	  June	  20,	  2012).	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The	  case	  of	  Central	  Kalimantan	  examined	  in	  this	  research	  did	  not	  involve	  police	  crackdowns	  related	  
to	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  private	  property	  of	  large-­‐scale	  gold-­‐mining	  companies.	  Rather,	  police	  
crackdowns	  began	  to	  intensify	  in	  2009	  when	  police	  came	  into	  areas	  that	  were	  beginning	  to	  be	  
prioritised	  for	  environmental	  restoration,	  collecting	  bribes.	  In	  Galangan,	  Central	  Kalimantan,	  an	  area	  
where	  UN-­‐supported	  capacity-­‐building	  programmes	  had	  attempted	  to	  assist	  a	  local	  NGO	  to	  promote	  
the	  introduction	  of	  cleaner	  ASM	  practices	  (Sulaiman	  et	  al.,	  2007),	  the	  Katingan	  District	  found	  itself	  
with	  less	  power	  two	  years	  after	  the	  UN	  project	  finished.	  District	  government	  policies	  to	  license	  and	  
regulate	  miners,	  which	  were	  introduced	  in	  2005	  and	  2007,	  did	  not	  turn	  into	  new	  licences	  being	  
issued	  for	  small-­‐scale	  gold	  miners	  in	  Galangan;	  however,	  when	  national	  moratoriums	  on	  licences	  
imposed	  in	  2009	  meant	  that	  districts	  no	  longer	  had	  the	  power	  to	  issue	  licences,24	  in	  essence	  a	  new	  
climate	  for	  recentralised	  decision-­‐making	  had	  arrived.	  The	  central	  government’s	  environmental	  
authorities,	  in	  particular,	  had	  accused	  the	  district	  governments	  in	  Central	  Kalimantan	  of	  being	  
reckless	  with	  licences	  since	  the	  1999	  Autonomy	  Laws,	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  environmental	  as	  well	  as	  
economic	  rationales	  appeared	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  central	  government’s	  initiation	  of	  a	  moratorium	  
on	  extraction	  licences.	  Following	  are	  three	  examples	  of	  the	  highly	  contentious	  implications	  of	  the	  
police	  crackdowns	  that	  began	  to	  occur	  increasingly	  in	  Galangan	  in	  2009,	  ostensibly	  to	  stop	  
illegal	  activity.	  
1. Renewed	  focus	  on	  national	  models	  for	  ecological	  modernisation	  and	  protection	  as	  barriers	  to	  
livelihood	  formalisation:	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Zimbabwe,	  Indonesia’s	  mining	  sector	  reveals	  a	  bias	  
towards	  bureaucratic	  EIA	  requirements	  that	  all	  miners	  –	  whether	  artisanal,	  small-­‐scale	  or	  large-­‐
scale	  –	  have	  to	  complete.	  One	  interviewee,	  a	  small-­‐scale	  miner	  in	  his	  late	  forties,	  submitted	  a	  
licence	  application	  in	  2008	  but	  now	  expects	  not	  to	  see	  the	  application	  processed	  for	  years,	  if	  at	  
all.	  He	  cited	  the	  inability	  to	  secure	  a	  legal	  business	  as	  a	  cause	  of	  immense	  stress	  and	  anxiety	  and	  
noted	  that	  this	  document	  has	  to	  go	  through	  national	  ministries	  and	  local	  district	  authorities’	  
review	  processes,	  which	  he	  believes	  could	  take	  years.	  The	  more	  significant	  environmental	  
barrier	  to	  formalising	  livelihoods	  in	  the	  small-­‐scale	  mining	  sector,	  however,	  is	  the	  issue	  of	  
national	  spatial	  planning	  in	  forest	  areas.	  A	  growing	  body	  of	  research	  has	  been	  addressing	  how	  
Central	  Kalimantan	  has	  become	  one	  of	  the	  top	  priorities	  –	  if	  not	  the	  single	  top	  priority	  –	  of	  the	  
central	  government	  and	  global	  donors	  in	  combating	  deforestation	  in	  Indonesia	  (McGregor,	  
2010).25	  The	  resource	  regulation	  complexities	  discussed	  above	  with	  regard	  to	  Galangan	  have	  
been	  reshaped,	  and	  in	  some	  sense	  transformed,	  by	  recent	  reform	  politics	  relating	  to	  licence	  
moratoriums	  and	  anti-­‐deforestation	  campaigns.	  One	  interviewee	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  global	  
anti-­‐deforestation	  scheme	  known	  as	  ‘REDD’	  (Reducing	  Emissions	  from	  Deforestation	  and	  Forest	  
Degradation)	  generates	  economic	  incentives	  for	  central	  government	  planners	  to	  establish	  and	  
enforce	  environmentally	  protected	  areas,	  even	  if	  such	  areas	  are	  sites	  of	  rural	  livelihood	  activity,	  
as	  also	  critically	  discussed	  in	  other	  provinces	  by	  McGregor	  (2010).	  Government	  interviewees	  
suggested	  that	  the	  area	  encompassing	  Galangan	  will	  be	  subject	  to	  this	  national	  scheme,	  but	  
specifics	  depend	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  government’s	  ongoing	  national	  ‘mapping’	  project,	  which	  
will	  identify	  spaces	  for	  ecological	  protection.	  Based	  on	  interviews	  with	  senior	  government	  staff,	  
there	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  indications	  that	  any	  national	  government	  agency	  has	  initiated	  
assessments	  to	  designate	  specific	  areas	  for	  ASM	  as	  part	  of	  this	  mapping	  project.	  The	  notion	  of	  
legalising	  ‘People’s	  Mining’	  is	  apparently	  far	  from	  a	  government	  priority.	  ‘We	  don’t	  know	  what	  
legalisation	  would	  look	  like…even	  if	  we	  could	  do	  it,’	  remarked	  one	  Katingan	  District	  Government	  
representative,	  while	  contemplating	  the	  fate	  of	  Galangan	  (interview,	  July	  2010,	  Kereng	  Pangi).	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Interview	  with	  district	  government	  official,	  July	  2010.	  
25	  See	  also	  http://www.redd-­‐monitor.org/2011/06/23/kalimantan-­‐forests-­‐and-­‐climate-­‐partnership-­‐faces-­‐yet-­‐more-­‐
criticism/	  (last	  accessed	  2	  June	  2012)	  
	  25	  
2. Unevenness	  in	  miners’	  level	  of	  resilience	  amid	  police	  crackdowns:	  A	  second	  significant	  impact	  
of	  the	  crackdown	  was	  the	  uneven	  financial	  impact	  of	  the	  policing	  on	  mining-­‐dependent	  villages.	  
In	  Galangan,	  one	  interviewee	  was	  an	  unlicensed	  miner	  in	  his	  late	  twenties	  whom	  I	  met	  as	  he	  
came	  to	  the	  gold	  shop	  to	  sell	  his	  week’s	  gold	  production.	  He	  and	  the	  gold	  shop	  owner	  both	  
confirmed	  that	  50%	  of	  the	  gold	  shops	  in	  the	  area	  had	  closed	  in	  the	  past	  year	  because	  of	  the	  
increased	  policing,	  which	  had	  significant	  ramifications	  for	  the	  economic	  life	  of	  the	  town	  (Kereng	  
Pangi).	  The	  owner	  of	  the	  gold	  shop	  noted	  that	  his	  shop’s	  gold	  stock	  had	  decreased	  by	  25%	  in	  
recent	  weeks.	  The	  shop	  owner	  mentioned	  that	  he	  typically	  buys	  from	  only	  40	  gold	  sellers	  per	  
day,	  rather	  than	  the	  previous	  norm	  of	  60	  persons	  per	  day.	  The	  miner	  who	  was	  interviewed	  was	  
not	  worried,	  however,	  because	  he	  was	  far	  more	  mobile	  than	  many	  other	  miners,	  as	  he	  and	  his	  
co-­‐workers	  travel	  to	  different	  gold	  deposits	  regularly	  and	  are	  very	  familiar	  with	  ways	  of	  paying	  
the	  police.	  The	  miner	  and	  his	  four	  co-­‐workers	  had	  earned	  24.5	  grams	  of	  gold	  during	  the	  week	  of	  
our	  interview.	  (This	  was	  in	  contrast	  to	  another	  interviewee,	  a	  woman	  in	  her	  forties	  who	  had	  two	  
sons	  in	  Galangan	  and	  depended	  on	  gold-­‐mining	  activities	  for	  income,	  but	  said	  that	  she	  was	  not	  
able	  to	  pay	  police	  bribes.)	  
3. The	  implications	  of	  policing	  in	  particular	  locales	  for	  surrounding	  areas:	  A	  third	  major	  impact	  of	  
the	  crackdown	  was	  the	  increased	  concern	  about	  the	  environmental	  impacts	  that	  policing	  in	  
particular	  areas	  could	  have	  on	  other	  surrounding	  areas.	  While	  mining	  in	  Galangan	  has	  had	  
significant	  impacts	  on	  the	  depletion	  of	  the	  forest	  and	  its	  moonscape-­‐like	  landscape	  covers	  nearly	  
200	  square	  kilometres,	  the	  outward	  expansion	  of	  mining	  into	  forest	  areas	  has	  slowed	  
substantially	  in	  recent	  years	  (Telmer	  and	  Stapper,	  2007).	  Some	  interviewees	  argued	  that	  the	  
continued	  mining	  of	  this	  area	  –	  especially	  given	  that	  this	  area’s	  forest	  is	  already	  clear-­‐cut	  –	  poses	  
considerably	  less	  of	  an	  ecosystem	  threat	  than	  other	  types	  of	  gold-­‐mining	  in	  rivers	  nearby,	  where	  
ongoing	  dredging	  erodes	  and	  contaminates	  the	  river.	  Dredging	  creates	  diesel	  pollution	  and	  
mercury	  contamination	  of	  waters	  used	  by	  community	  members	  and	  severe	  sedimentation	  that	  
has	  had	  negative	  impacts	  on	  fish	  supplies;	  numerous	  interviewees	  made	  these	  points	  to	  contrast	  
dredging	  to	  land-­‐based	  mining	  in	  Galangan.	  One	  miner	  took	  me	  on	  a	  boat	  trip	  to	  see	  the	  
dredging	  up	  close	  in	  the	  Kahayan	  River	  –	  which	  is	  far	  less	  policed	  and	  less	  accessible	  than	  the	  
land-­‐based	  mining	  in	  Galangan.	  Some	  estimates	  suggest	  that	  some	  3,000	  to	  6,000	  dredges	  have	  
been	  made	  in	  the	  Kahayan	  River.26	  The	  policing	  activities	  in	  Galangan	  have,	  according	  to	  some	  
miners,	  forced	  miners	  to	  do	  more	  dredging	  and	  the	  impacts	  of	  livelihood	  transitions	  have	  yet	  to	  
be	  fully	  researched.	  
	  
	   	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	   Arguably,	  the	  river	  mining	  with	  these	  dredges	  causes	  far	  more	  environmental	  destruction	  than	  land-­‐based	  mining,	  
because	  of	  the	  erosion	  of	  river	  sediment,	  the	  oil	  that	  goes	  directly	  in	  the	  water	  from	  the	  dredges,	  and	  other	  factors.	  My	  
purpose	  is	  not	  to	  demonise	  river	  miners;	  rather,	  it	  is	  to	  share	  the	  perspective	  here	  that	  certain	  categories	  of	  ASM	  may	  have	  
much	  more	  significant	  ecological	  impacts	  than	  others,	  and	  that	  policing	  land-­‐based	  mining	  in	  Galangan	  may	  have	  
unintended	  consequences	  by	  driving	  people	  into	  river	  mining.	  
26	  
6. Synthesis	  of	  comparative	  analysis	  and	  future	  
directions	  for	  research	  and	  policy	  
	  
6.1. Formalisation	  revisited:	  Scales	  of	  contestation	  
A	  key	  insight	  during	  the	  study,	  which	  shaped	  this	  study’s	  approach	  in	  developing	  a	  comparative	  
analysis,	  was	  that	  local	  district	  governments	  in	  each	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  had	  been	  explicitly	  
undermined	  by	  central	  government	  authorities	  with	  respect	  to	  managing	  mining	  activity	  in	  a	  
coherent	  fashion.	  Miners	  and	  other	  local	  community	  members	  also	  felt	  that	  local	  governments	  have	  
failed	  them	  and,	  in	  some	  ways,	  that	  global	  institutions	  have	  failed	  them	  too.	  A	  series	  of	  scales	  of	  
geographical	  interrelation	  can	  be	  traced	  (e.g.	  national	  to	  district,	  district	  to	  local,	  international	  to	  
national,	  and	  many	  others);	  this	  study	  traced	  just	  some	  of	  these	  relational	  scales,	  highlighting	  the	  
relevance	  of	  centralisation	  and	  decentralisation	  in	  formalisation	  debates.	  I	  do	  not	  suggest	  that	  there	  
is	  a	  constant	  one-­‐way	  ‘cascade’	  of	  power	  flowing	  through	  these	  relational	  scales;	  I	  suggest	  instead	  
that	  they	  are	  open	  to	  multiple	  configurations	  of	  power	  structures	  and	  changing	  pressures	  over	  time.	  
	  
Ultimately,	  the	  approach	  in	  the	  analysis	  focused	  more	  on	  problems	  that	  arise	  in	  examining	  the	  
centralising	  of	  power	  and	  less	  on	  the	  problems	  that	  may	  arise	  from	  decentralising	  decision-­‐making	  
power	  in	  governing	  mining.	  This	  is	  for	  a	  particular	  reason:	  central	  government	  agencies	  both	  in	  
Indonesia	  and	  in	  Zimbabwe	  took	  steps	  to	  explicitly	  recentralise	  decision-­‐making	  power	  in	  the	  mining	  
sector	  during	  the	  study	  period	  (2005–2010).	  In	  some	  sense,	  the	  focus	  on	  ‘recentralising	  power’	  at	  a	  
national	  scale	  thus	  speaks	  to	  the	  historical	  particularities	  of	  this	  study.	  Nonetheless,	  while	  focusing	  
on	  contemporary	  experiences	  of	  ‘recentralisation’,	  an	  opportunity	  arises	  to	  reconceptualise	  the	  
extent	  to	  which	  national	  and	  regional	  scales	  of	  decision-­‐making	  interact,	  how	  recentralisation	  
dynamics	  can	  be	  contextualised	  within	  a	  wider	  historical	  understanding	  of	  mineral	  governance	  
regimes,	  which	  differ	  in	  Zimbabwe	  and	  Indonesia,	  and	  also	  how	  global	  institutions	  relate	  to	  
contested	  scales	  of	  decision-­‐making	  power.	  In	  examining	  the	  recent	  ‘recentralisation’	  dynamics,	  the	  
study	  has	  also	  suggested	  that	  rural	  mining	  groups	  do	  make	  efforts	  to	  ‘re-­‐decentralise’	  power	  by	  
taking	  power	  into	  their	  own	  hands.	  Further	  work	  is	  needed	  to	  sketch	  out	  strategies	  of	  resilience	  on	  
the	  ground	  while	  rethinking	  the	  implications	  of	  multi-­‐scaled	  regulation	  dynamics.	  Table	  2	  illustrates	  
a	  variety	  of	  points	  of	  comparison	  to	  highlight	  factors	  affecting	  formalisation	  barriers	  for	  small-­‐scale	  
producers	  in	  the	  mining	  sector.	  
	  
	  
Table	  2	  indicates	  that	  revenue	  from	  mining	  is	  distributed	  in	  different	  ways	  in	  Zimbabwe	  and	  
Indonesia.	  While	  local	  district	  governments	  in	  Indonesia	  have	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  institutional	  
capacity	  and	  empowerment	  from	  revenues,	  Rural	  District	  Councils	  in	  Zimbabwe	  have	  significantly	  
lost	  powers	  and	  capacities	  in	  the	  past	  decade.	  A	  variety	  of	  other	  factors	  can	  be	  used	  as	  points	  of	  
comparison,	  e.g.	  in	  Zimbabwe,	  tribute	  policies	  exist	  to	  negotiate	  contested	  space	  between	  large	  and	  
small-­‐scale	  miners,	  whereas	  no	  tribute	  policies	  exist	  in	  Indonesia.	  The	  different	  technical	  
specifications	  for	  licences	  also	  provide	  a	  notable	  contrast,	  and	  the	  barriers	  to	  ASM	  ‘formalisation’	  
can	  be	  seen	  in	  this	  table	  as	  emanating	  from	  a	  convergence	  of	  multiple	  factors	  –	  factors	  that	  have	  
changed	  considerably	  over	  time.	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Table	  2.	   Comparison	  of	  Case	  Studies:	  Factors	  Affecting	  Formalisation	  Barriers	  
	  
6.2. Towards	  research-­‐informed	  governance	  models:	  Engaging	  the	  
livelihood	  concerns	  of	  small-­‐scale	  producers?	  
This	  paper	  has	  examined	  why	  scalar-­‐sensitive	  research	  across	  sectors	  is	  needed	  to	  inform	  ways	  of	  
developing	  sound	  frameworks	  for	  rural	  resource	  governance.	  It	  has	  documented	  some	  of	  the	  recent	  
effects	  of	  ‘formalisation’	  paradigms,	  and	  while	  many	  sectors	  reveal	  contentious	  governance	  
dynamics,	  the	  mining	  sector	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  sector	  where	  impacts	  on	  small-­‐scale	  producers	  in	  
recent	  years	  suggest	  that	  central	  government	  formalisation	  policies	  are	  leading	  to	  growing	  threats	  to	  
livelihood	  security.	  Because	  mineral	  rights	  often	  take	  precedence	  over	  traditional	  land	  rights	  in	  
developing	  countries	  (Hilson,	  2008),	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  should	  be	  understood	  carefully,	  as	  
Case	  Study	  Point	  of	  Comparison	   Zimbabwe	  Gold-­‐Mining	  
Case	  Study	  
Indonesia	  Gold-­‐Mining	  Case	  Study	  
%	  of	  area	  covered	  by	  large	  or	  
medium-­‐scale	  companies’	  
mining/exploration	  licences	  
95%	  of	  Great	  Dyke	  area	  covered	  
(source:	  Zimbabwe	  Miners	  
Federation,	  2007)	  
Most	  of	  Galangan	  under	  zircon	  
company	  concession	  (but	  no	  gold-­‐
mining	  licences	  issued)	  
Key	  policies	  for	  mining	   1996	  Mines	  and	  Minerals	  Act;	  
1991	  Mining	  (Alluvial	  Gold)	  
(Public	  Streams)	  Regulations;	  
Indigenisation	  and	  Economic	  
Empowerment	  (General)	  
Regulations	  SI	  21	  of	  2010	  
Mining	  Law	  11	  of	  1967;	  Autonomy	  
Legislation	  of	  1999;	  Katingan	  District	  
Regulation	  No.	  3	  (2006);	  2009	  
Mining	  Law	  
	  
National	  policies	  shaping	  small-­‐scale	  
miners’	  relation	  to	  larger	  mining	  
companies	  
Tribute	  policies	  exist	  to	  facilitate	  
concession	  sharing	  between	  
ASMs	  and	  large-­‐scale	  companies	  
No	  tribute	  policies	  exist	  
Spatial	  dimensions	  of	  small-­‐scale	  
mining	  laws	  
Minimum	  for	  pegging	  is	  
100	  hectares	  
A	  people’s	  mining	  permit	  granted	  to	  an	  
individual	  may	  cover	  a	  maximum	  area	  
of	  5	  (five)	  hectares;	  a	  cooperative	  may	  
be	  provided	  with	  a	  people’s	  mining	  
permit	  covering	  a	  maximum	  area	  of	  25	  
(twenty-­‐five)	  hectares	  
Policies	  to	  decentralise	  mineral	  
revenues	  (of	  relevance	  to	  
empowering	  district	  governance	  
institutions	  in	  mineral	  governance)	  
Rural	  District	  Councils	  receive	  
less	  than	  0.001%	  of	  official	  
revenue	  	  
Local	  government	  and	  provinces	  
receive	  39%	  official	  revenue	  allocations	  
from	  mining	  company	  tax	  revenues;	  
the	  remaining	  61%	  goes	  to	  the	  central	  
government	  (source:	  
PricewaterhouseCoopers,	  2006)	  
Formal	  powers	  of	  local	  government	  
institutions	  in	  licensing	  (changes	  
during	  2005–2010)	  
Main	  powers	  terminated	  by	  
central	  government	  in	  
all	  districts	  
Main	  powers	  terminated	  by	  central	  
government	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
Katingan	  District	  
Value	  of	  commodity	  in	  case	  
study	  context	  
Value	  of	  geological	  deposits	  are	  
high	  in	  Insiza	  District	  and	  
Kadoma-­‐Chakari	  area	  
Value	  of	  geological	  deposits	  are	  
unknown/not	  high	  in	  the	  Galangan	  
region	  of	  Central	  Kalimantan	  
Major	  ‘environmental	  policy’	  barrier	  
to	  formalisation	  
Environmental	  Impact	  
Assessment	  (EIA)	  fees	  (fees	  for	  
mandatory	  consultancy	  reports	  
and	  government	  processing)	  
National	  forestry	  mapping	  (especially	  
for	  REDD)	  and	  moratoriums	  on	  
licences;	  secondarily,	  bans	  on	  mercury	  
use	  and	  EIAs	  
Cost	  of	  fees	  for	  EIA	  approval	   >4,000	  US	  dollars	   >3,000	  US	  dollars	  
Formal	  associations	  in	  ASM	  case	  
study	  context	  
	  
Multiple	  formally	  registered	  
(national	  and	  regional)	  ASM	  
associations	  exist	  
No	  formally	  registered	  
associations	  exist	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different	  kinds	  of	  actors	  (not	  just	  ‘miners’	  generally)	  may	  be	  rewarded	  and/or	  disadvantaged	  as	  a	  
consequence,	  raising	  further	  complexities	  that	  trouble	  the	  ‘win–win’	  narrative	  of	  formalisation.	  A	  
government	  policy	  framework’s	  bias	  in	  favour	  of	  mining	  might	  seem	  to	  give	  ‘miners’	  strong	  
opportunity	  for	  formalising	  their	  operations.	  To	  give	  one	  contextual	  illustration,	  past	  reports	  in	  
Zimbabwe	  might	  at	  first	  seem	  to	  indicate	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  given	  that	  mining	  legislation	  in	  
Zimbabwe	  has	  allowed	  miners	  to	  peg	  claims	  on	  farmers’	  land	  even	  without	  obtaining	  permission	  
from	  the	  farmer	  first.	  As	  David	  Love	  –	  one	  of	  Zimbabwe’s	  leading	  environmental	  law	  experts	  –	  notes,	  
the	  miner	  is	  merely	  required	  to	  inform	  the	  farmer	  and	  acquire	  the	  necessary	  licences	  and	  permission	  
from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Mines	  and	  Mining	  Development	  (Love,	  2005).27	  Despite	  this	  legal	  bias	  in	  favour	  
of	  mining,	  which	  Love	  identifies	  as	  a	  legacy	  of	  colonial	  law,	  this	  arrangement	  has	  not	  necessarily	  
benefited	  poorer	  small-­‐scale	  mining	  workers.	  Mining	  communities	  are	  far	  from	  homogeneous,	  and	  
although	  policies	  have	  been	  designed	  with	  the	  intent	  of	  standardising	  approaches	  for	  legitimate	  
extraction,	  this	  standardisation	  has	  led	  to	  new	  problems.	  Zimbabwe	  and	  Indonesia	  are	  both	  
examples	  where,	  although	  prospective	  operators	  are	  required	  to	  undertake	  a	  series	  of	  drawn-­‐out	  
bureaucratic	  tasks	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  a	  parcel	  of	  resource	  rights	  through	  legal	  channels,	  informal-­‐
sector	  workers	  may	  or	  may	  not	  have	  the	  political	  connections	  necessary	  for	  acquiring	  these	  rights,	  
the	  capacity	  or	  the	  knowledge	  of	  how	  to	  make	  the	  legalisation	  process	  work.	  Where	  a	  ‘scalar’	  
critique	  can	  assist	  this	  discussion	  is	  by	  considering	  how	  the	  technocratic	  design	  and	  implementation	  
of	  national	  regulation	  regimes	  might	  serve	  various	  political	  interests	  that	  defy	  simple	  linear	  
conceptual	  models	  of	  regulation,	  that	  might	  be	  shaped	  by	  diverse	  actors	  at	  different	  geographical	  
scales,	  and	  that	  might	  be	  subverted	  in	  complex	  ways	  too,	  rendering,	  in	  turn,	  complexities	  for	  
imagining	  the	  possibility	  for	  resisting	  regimes	  of	  indiscriminate	  rural	  criminalisation.	  
	  
Decriminalising	  livelihoods	  in	  conditions	  of	  economic	  hardship	  is	  a	  necessary	  step	  towards	  more	  
sustainable	  resource	  management,	  but	  decriminalisation	  requires	  paying	  careful	  attention	  to	  the	  
nuances	  and	  regional	  differences	  in	  how	  small-­‐scale	  producers	  work.	  This	  is	  particularly	  needed	  in	  
situations	  of	  potentially	  high-­‐risk	  activity	  such	  as	  in	  small-­‐scale	  mining	  contexts,	  where	  a	  range	  of	  
socio-­‐environmental	  complexities	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  with	  context-­‐sensitive	  approaches	  that	  
extend	  considerably	  the	  ‘modernisation’	  models	  that	  have	  largely	  embraced	  the	  image	  of	  the	  
corporate	  mining	  company	  as	  the	  legitimate	  model	  of	  resource	  exploitation.	  EIA	  models,	  for	  
instance,	  cannot	  be	  effective	  when	  they	  require	  small-­‐scale	  producers	  to	  act	  and	  pay	  as	  if	  they	  were	  
large-­‐scale	  companies	  (i.e.	  requiring	  small-­‐scale	  miners	  to	  pay	  more	  than	  4,000	  US	  dollars	  for	  the	  
EIA).	  In	  both	  Indonesia	  and	  Zimbabwe,	  EIA	  models	  have	  yet	  to	  be	  adapted	  to	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  
capacities	  and	  realities	  of	  small-­‐scale	  producers	  in	  the	  gold-­‐mining	  sector.	  UN	  agencies	  have	  
launched	  an	  effort	  to	  promote	  more	  sensitive	  regulations,	  for	  instance,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  regulatory	  
frameworks	  that	  can	  help	  to	  decriminalise	  the	  use	  of	  mercury	  in	  low-­‐income	  mining	  communities	  
that	  depend	  on	  rudimentary	  gold-­‐mining	  extraction	  practices.	  UNIDO	  and	  the	  UN	  Environment	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	   Love	  (2005)	  examines	  how	  historically,	  as	  a	  relic	  of	  colonial	  policy	  that	  has	  persisted	  in	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  era,	  an	  
‘overwhelming	  bias	  to	  mining	  in	  Zimbabwe’s	  legislation’	  (p.	  46)	  has	  meant	  that	  ‘mining	  law	  overrides	  much	  of	  other	  natural	  
resource	  management	  law,	  including	  water,	  environment	  and	  land’	  (p.	  46).	  Love’s	  (2005)	  discussion	  of	  biases	  towards	  the	  
mining	  sector	  in	  Zimbabwean	  law	  can	  be	  compared	  with	  Gandataruna	  and	  Haymon’s	  (2011)	  discussion	  of	  biases	  towards	  
mining	  in	  Indonesia’s	  legal	  framework.	  While	  the	  Indonesian	  legal	  framework	  is	  not	  as	  explicitly	  biased	  in	  favour	  of	  mining,	  
as	  the	  law	  notes	  that	  some	  degree	  of	  ‘approval	  of	  land	  title	  holders’	  is	  required	  before	  licensed	  mining	  companies	  can	  
begin	  operations,	  Gandataruna	  and	  Haymon	  (2011)	  note	  that	  ambiguities	  and	  weaknesses	  in	  the	  law	  effectively	  mean	  that	  
the	  legal	  framework	  ‘implies	  that	  land	  title	  holders	  have	  no	  right	  to	  refuse	  access	  to	  mining	  license	  holders’	  (p.	  226).	  Thus,	  
both	  Zimbabwe	  and	  Indonesia	  provide	  examples	  where	  national	  legal	  frameworks	  on	  paper	  appear	  to	  prioritise	  mining	  
above	  other	  sectors,	  even	  if	  small-­‐scale	  mining	  communities	  have	  not	  necessarily	  benefited	  from	  the	  laws.	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Programme	  have	  proposed	  International	  Guidelines	  on	  Mercury	  Management	  in	  Small-­‐Scale	  Gold	  
Mining	  (see	  Spiegel	  and	  Veiga,	  2010),	  but	  at	  present,	  many	  governments	  continue	  to	  adhere	  to	  
environmental	  and	  rural	  planning	  models	  that	  conform	  to	  the	  models	  of	  larger-­‐scale	  operations,	  not	  
small-­‐scale	  production,	  and	  the	  practices	  of	  rudimentary	  ASM	  are	  still	  generally	  not	  recognised	  in	  
national	  legislation	  or	  policy.	  Furthermore,	  as	  global	  initiatives	  such	  as	  REDD	  are	  being	  accompanied	  
by	  central	  government	  efforts	  to	  impose	  moratoriums	  and	  block	  local	  districts	  from	  licensing	  mining	  
(e.g.	  as	  in	  Katingan	  District,	  Indonesia),	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  low-­‐income	  small-­‐scale	  
producers	  will	  be	  able	  to	  find	  effective	  means	  of	  negotiating	  ‘formal	  legitimacy’	  when	  licensing	  
options	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  available.	  Large-­‐scale	  mining	  companies	  have	  managed	  to	  receive	  
exemption	  from	  some	  of	  the	  national	  environmental	  planning	  schemes	  and	  moratoriums,	  but,	  as	  
small-­‐scale	  producers	  tend	  to	  have	  less	  negotiating	  power	  with	  national	  governance	  agents	  and	  
international	  institutions,	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  global	  institutions	  will	  invest	  in	  new	  
approaches	  to	  respond	  to	  complex	  livelihood	  situations	  (such	  as	  those	  in	  gold-­‐mining	  areas).	  
	  
To	  conclude,	  detailed	  research	  is	  also	  evidently	  needed	  on	  the	  interlinkage	  between	  rural	  resource	  
sectors;	  it	  is	  recognised	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  heavy-­‐handed	  law	  enforcement	  campaigns	  to	  stop	  
unlicensed	  livelihood	  practices	  in	  one	  sector	  is	  like	  to	  have	  effects	  on	  other	  sectors	  too.	  This	  study	  
encountered	  cases	  in	  Indonesia	  where	  illegal	  loggers,	  when	  policed,	  became	  gold	  miners	  and	  where	  
illegal	  land-­‐based	  gold	  miners,	  when	  policed,	  began	  to	  depend	  on	  river	  dredging	  (a	  more	  ecologically	  
severe	  form	  of	  gold-­‐mining);	  it	  also	  encountered	  cases	  in	  Zimbabwe	  where	  illegal	  riverbed	  gold	  
panners,	  when	  policed,	  became	  primary	  ore	  gold	  miners,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  Law	  enforcement	  
campaigns	  as	  conceptualised	  by	  far-­‐away	  central	  government	  planners	  rarely	  seem	  to	  work	  out	  in	  
the	  manner	  planned.	  Embracing	  a	  vision	  of	  ‘ordered,	  gridlike	  spaces’	  (Ferguson,	  2007,	  p.	  72)	  for	  
resource	  management	  becomes	  a	  dangerous	  analytic	  trend	  when	  governments	  decide	  to	  centralise	  
power	  over	  rural	  resource	  governance.	  If	  long-­‐lasting	  solutions	  for	  sustainable	  and	  equitable	  
resource	  governance	  are	  to	  be	  found,	  and	  if	  informal	  economies	  are	  to	  be	  engaged	  more	  fruitfully,	  
more	  research-­‐informed	  policy	  development	  processes	  need	  to	  be	  attuned	  to	  the	  heterogeneity	  in	  
livelihood	  practices,	  the	  risks	  in	  central	  planners’	  standardised	  visions	  of	  rural	  order	  and	  resource	  
governance	  and	  the	  contextual	  possibilities	  for	  governance	  alternatives.	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